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INTRODUCTION
The exclusionary evidence rules derived from the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments continue to play an important role in constitutional
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criminal procedure, despite the intense controversy that surrounds them.
The primary justification for these rules has shifted from an "imperative of
judicial integrity" to the "deterrence of police conduct that violates... [con-
stitutional] rights."1 Regardless of the justification it uses for the rules'
existence, the Supreme Court continues to limit their breadth "at the mar-
gin," when "the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational sys-
tem of criminal justice" outweigh the deterrent effects of exclusion.2
The most notable limitation on the exclusionary rules is the impeach-
ment exception, which permits the use of illegally obtained evidence at trial
to impeach the defendant's testimony. The shift from a judicial integrity
rationale to a deterrence rationale for the rules, however, does not explain
the origins of this exception. The Court created the impeachment exception
in 1954 in Walder v. United States,3 before rejecting the judicial integrity
approach. Walder suggests that the Court has supported the exception
based on principle, as well as on policy considerations. 4
This article argues that attempts to justify the impeachment exception as
a matter of policy or as a matter of principle are equally misguided. Both
methods wrongly consider the integrity of factfinding at a criminal trial a
value that can meaningfully be balanced against the constitutional values
protected by the exclusionary rules.5 Instead, a coherent approach to the
scope of the exclusionary rules must approach that question entirely as a
matter of constitutional criminal procedure. Constitutional guarantees do
not supply independent values to balance against the integrity of factfind-
1. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976).
2. Id. at 494.
3. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
4. I use the terms principles and policies to refer respectively to noninstrumental and instru-
mental justifications for legal rules. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1978); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term: Foreward: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
5. For those accustomed to thinking about the principle-based approach to constitutional adju-
dication as an "absolutist" alternative to balancing, it will seem odd to criticize a principled ap-
proach for balancing anything, much less balancing improperly. Nonetheless, because thoughtful
principled approaches often acknowledge the need to determine the range of application of (at least
potentially) conflicting principles according to their weight in varying circumstances, they entail
balancing in the most profound sense of the term. The modem experience of the inevitability of
balancing, ably described by Professor Aleinikoff, is, although often crudely associated with utilitari-
anism, by no means limited to instrumentalist legal reasoning. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Consti-
tutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 949-52 (1987) (noting that categorical
distinctions emphasizing differences in kind rather than degree distinguish 19th century constitu-
tional law, whether instrumentalist or not); see also James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpreta-
tions of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against
the State, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 381, 404-37 (1982) (describing how categorical distinctions between
rights and remedies, and property and expectancies ordered the central jurisprudence of vested
rights, whether conceived as instrumentalist or formalist, or whether supported by positivist or natu-
ral law theories). This article's critique of the Court's principled justifications for the impeachment
exception, however, does not require resolution of the question whether principles properly can have
the dimension of weight. The reader who finds references to balancing competing principles jarring
may read the critique of the Court's approach as a criticism of its determination that the principle
underlying the exclusionary rules does not trump that supporting the impeachment exception.
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ing-they define that integrity.6 Consequently, the impeachment exception
should be eliminated because it improperly compromises constitutional rules
of criminal procedure in the name of furthering what the Court claims to be
"other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice."' 7
This article examines the doctrine that the courts have employed to es-
tablish the boundaries of the impeachment exception.8 It develops an inter-
nal critique9 of that doctrine's ability to establish coherent limits to the
exception, given the underlying principles or policies that it purports to
serve. The benefits of using an internal critique are twofold. First, this
method permits a comparison between the assumptions underlying the doc-
trine and the reality of the criminal trial process. It uses the boundary dis-
putes generated by cases to analyze how the Court's conception of the
criminal process informs the impeachment exception. The critique chal-
lenges that conception in light of the Court's inability to coherently resolve
recurring questions about the proper scope of the impeachment exception.
Second, the internal critique allows an evaluation of the impeachment
exception free from different substantive arguments for particular exclusion-
ary rules. Despite the continued controversy over evidentiary exclusion, and
despite the constantly changing nature of constitutional criminal procedure,
the Court seems disinclined to engage in a wholesale reversal of all Fourth,
6. The critique of the principle-based approach to the impeachment exception is directed at the
Court's claim that principled justifications warrant the exception. I do not mean to imply that those
who generally advocate a principle-based approach to constitutional adjudication would necessarily
endorse the Court's appraisal of the relevant principles. Indeed, I think it likely that Dworkin, for
example, would argue that a proper application of the principle-based approach would support this
article's conclusion that the exception should be eliminated. That the principle- and policy-based
approaches can each accommodate such different results demonstrates that a critique of only one
approach to the doctrine will necessarily remain partial and, thus, of limited utility. See generally
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & PoLrrIcs 1-3 (1975) (discussing limitations of
partial critique).
7. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
8. This article is therefore a study of the way boundary doctrines function. It evaluates the
"problem" purportedly "solved" by those doctrines and offers a framework within which to under-
stand their historical evolution. For articles employing similar methods, see Kainen, supra note 5;
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure ofBlackstone's Commentaries 28 Buiu. L. REv. 209 (1979). For
general comment on the method, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 213-
68 (1987); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984). The emphasis
on boundary doctrine is particularly appropriate to this article's internal critique of the impeach-
ment exception. See note 9 infra and accompanying text. The inability of the principle- or policy-
based justifications for the impeachment exception to generate limits that are consistent with those
justifications provides the most compelling evidence that the exception is misconceived.
9. On the distinction between internal and external critiques, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 4,
at 279-90. The internal critique developed in this article evaluates the impeachment exception
within the frameworks established by the Court's policy- and principle-based analyses. Accordingly,
it criticizes the exception because of its inability to rationally accommodate either its principle- or
policy-based goals to those of the exclusionary rules. The critique is not internal in the sense of
focusing only on the logic of the doctrine. It is grounded in empirical and normative realities of
criminal trial practice, as presently practiced and conceived. Those realities undermine the legiti-
macy of the impeachment exception, not the more general notion that ultimately, the exception, no
more than any other legal rule, can be demonstrated to represent an unproblematic solution to a
difficult problem.
July 1992] 1303
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Fifth, and Sixth Amendment exclusionary rules.' 0 Accordingly, general
questions about the extent of those rules--questions cutting across different
kinds of constitutional protections-are likely to persist.
The internal critique of the impeachment exception asks whether exclu-
sionary rules, as currently qualified by the impeachment exception, serve
their purported instrumental or principled goals. This article suggests that
they do not, and argues that a meaningful reexamination of Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendment exclusionary rules should focus on the substantive
values underlying those rules, rather than on the effect of evidentiary exclu-
sion on the factfinding process at a criminal trial.
Part One traces the doctrines with which the Court defined the scope of
the impeachment exception until its recent decision in James v. Illinois."
The Court perceived the scope of the exception at various times as informed
by policies or principles. The policy approach depicts the exception as the
product of an instrumental balance between truth-seeking and deterrence.
The principle-based approach defines the exception as the product of princi-
ples holding that the conviction of a defendant with illegally obtained evi-
dence, or his exoneration by defense perjury, violates the integrity of a
criminal trial.
Part Two examines the limits of the policy approach to the impeachment
exception. The Court's decision in James reveals that a true balance be-
tween deterrence and truth-seeking cannot be achieved in practice. The
Court relies on the evidentiary concepts of impeachment and rebuttal proof
to determine the appropriate scope of the exception, but these concepts are
unusable when wrenched outside of their traditional context. Thus, the bal-
ancing analysis fails in James because of its own incoherence rather than
from any unique difficulty associated with the issue in that case.
Part Three examines the alternative, principle-based boundary doctrine.
It explores how the Court limits the reach of the impeachment exception by
using the evidentiary concepts of the burden of proof and collateral evidence
to distinguish between affirmative and negative uses of illegal proof. The
strained distinction between affirmative and negative uses reveals, however,
that traditional evidentiary concepts are incapable of generating boundaries
to the exception without betraying its underlying principles.
Part Four generalizes the critiques of the policy and principle approaches
to the problem of the impeachment exception's boundaries. It argues that
these boundary doctrines fail to establish coherent limitations on the im-
peachment exception because of a common, faulty premise. That premise
bifurcates the criminal process into fact-gathering and factfinding compo-
nents governed by conflicting norms embodied in constitutional criminal
procedure and evidentiary principles. The Court has failed to find bounda-
ries to the impeachment exception that rationally accommodate these con-
10. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990) (extending the application of Mi-
randa's exclusionary rule).
11. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
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flicting values, demonstrating that the accommodation sought is illusory and
its premise misconceived. The fundamental error of the impeachment ex-
ception does not arise from the decision to use a policy or a principled ap-
proach. Rather, it lies in the false conception that the contradictory values
reflected in constitutional criminal procedure and evidentiary principles are
susceptible to neutral accommodation.
Part Four also examines the immediate implications of this analysis for
the impeachment exception. This article urges the elimination of the excep-
tion and proposes rethinking the limits of the exclusionary rules exclusively
as a matter of the substantive values informing constitutional criminal proce-
dure. The Court's attempt to distinguish between those constitutional rules
of criminal procedure that define the means of obtaining evidence as illegal
and those that define the use of such evidence at trial as illegal cannot be
sustained. Thus, this article concludes that any analysis of the scope of the
exclusionary rules should be recast exclusively as an issue of constitutional
criminal procedure, rather than as a compromise between those rules and
the principles of evidence.
I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND OF THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
BEFORE JAMES V ILLINOIS
The Supreme Court first applied the impeachment exception in the 1954
case of Walder v. United States.12 In Walder, the Court allowed the prose-
cution to use illegally obtained evidence from a prior investigation to im-
peach a defendant's testimony that he had never possessed heroin.13 An
indictment stemming from the earlier investigation had been dismissed when
the fruits of an illegal search were suppressed.14 On a later, unrelated charge
of heroin possession, Walder testified that he had never possessed heroin.' 5
The trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce the evidence from the
prior search, in spite of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, and the
Supreme Court affirmed Walder's conviction. 16 Although the exclusionary
rules prohibited the prosecution from making "an affirmative use of evidence
unlawfully obtained," the Court refused to permit the defendant to "turn the
illegal method by which [the] evidence... was obtained to his own advan-
tage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his
untruths."'17
Walder distinguished the earlier case of Agnello v. United States,18 in
which the Court had refused to permit the admission of an illegally seized
can of cocaine to rebut a defendant's testimony. Agnello was charged with
12. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
13. Id. at 65-66.
14. Id. at 62-63.
15. Id. at 63.
16. Id. at 64.
17. Id. at 65.
18. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
July 1992] 1305
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conspiracy to sell cocaine. 19 The prosecution introduced testimony estab-
lishing that Agnello met with the conspirators at his home and then accom-
panied them to a location where he delivered small packages of cocaine in
exchange for money.20 In his direct testimony, Agnello conceded that he
had possessed and delivered the packages, but denied having had knowledge
of their contents.21 On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited Agnello's
testimony that he had never seen narcotics.22 The prosecutor then intro-
duced, over objection, a can of cocaine that had been illegally seized from
Agnello's house.23 The Supreme Court reversed Agnello's conviction, not-
ing that in his direct testimony Agnello "was not asked and did not testify
concerning the can of cocaine" and thus "did nothing to waive his constitu-
tional protection or to justify cross-examination . . [regarding] the
evidence." '2 4
The Walder Court distinguished Agnello on the grounds that the prose-
cutor in Agnello had attempted "to smuggle ... [the evidence] in on cross-
examination by asking the accused the broad question" about whether he
had ever seen narcotics. 25 More significantly, the Walder Court also empha-
sized the character of the respective defendants' testimony to explain the
different results. Unlike Agnello, Walder "[o]f his own accord ... went
beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes ... charged" and made a
false assertion about a "collateral matter" (his past history).2 6 Although
"the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the
accusation against him" by leaving him "free to deny all the elements of the
case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to intro-
duce ... evidence illegally secured," Walder's testimony had not been so
limited.27 Thus, there was "hardly justification for letting the defendant af-
firmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's
disability to challenge his credibility."28
Following Walder, the lower courts attempted to follow this reasoning,
permitting impeachment with illegally obtained evidence only when it re-
lated to "collateral matters."' 29 The Court did not revisit the impeachment
19. Id. at 28.
20. Id. at 29.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 29-30.
24. Id. at 35. The Court also relied upon Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920), in which it had noted: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not be used at all."
25. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66 (1954).
26. Id. at 65.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Mary Jo White, Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Exclu-
sionary Rules, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1476, 1479-80 (1973); Note, The Collateral Use Doctrine: From
Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 912, 923 (1968); see also United States ex rel Dixon v.
Cavell, 284 F. Supp. 535, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (holding that the statements at issue "were sufficiently
collateral to be properly characterized as harmless"); United States v. Birrell, 276 F. Supp. 798, 817
1306 [Vol. 44:1301
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exception until 1971 in Harris v. New York 30 when it decided to apply the
exception to evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment right to receive the now familiar Miranda warnings before custodial
interrogation. In so doing, the Court also dealt a severe blow to Agnello by
eliminating its collateral use requirement. The Harris Court acknowledged
that Harris was impeached with evidence "bearing more directly on the
crimes charged," while Walder's impeachment related "to collateral matters
included in his direct examination. '3 1 Nonetheless, the Court found no
"difference in principle" between direct and collateral evidence because ex-
cluding either would turn "[tihe shield provided by Miranda ... into a li-
cense to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances."'32
The demise of the collateral use limitation might also be explained by the
passing of the anti-perjury, judicial integrity rationale from which it sprang.
By the time of the Harris decision, the deterrence rationale for the exclusion-
ary rules had come to the fore.33 Thus, in addition to discussing principles
of judicial integrity underlying the exception, the Court rationalized its deci-
sion by balancing the effect of admissibility on trial accuracy against the
effect of exclusion on deterring Miranda violations. While the truth-seeking
benefits of the exception were manifest because "[t]he impeachment process
here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner's
credibility," the Court also found that "sufficient deterrence flows when the
evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in
chief."34
In the 1975 decision of Oregon v. Hass,3 5 the Court again addressed the
admissibility of statements obtained in violation of Miranda. But in Hass,
the police properly gave the defendant the required warnings; they violated
Miranda when they improperly continued interrogation after Hass requested
counsel. 36 The Oregon Supreme Court had distinguished this situation from
one in which the police fail to give proper warning. It asserted that despite
the impeachment exception, the police might be deterred from the latter vio-
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that "suppressed evidence may be used to impeach the testimony of de-
fense witnesses as to collateral matters").
30. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
31. Id. at 225. The evidence in question was an admission that contradicted the defendant's
denial of the crime charged (sale of drugs to undercover police officers). Id. at 223.
32. Id. at 225, 226.
33. Kamisar identifies the origins of the shift from the judicial integrity rationale to the deter-
rence rationale in the Court's decision in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Yale Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical
Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 627 (1983). These origins came to fruition in Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
34. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. Dissenting, Justice Brennan relied on the collateral use doctrine
but also noted dicta in Miranda asserting that statements "used to impeach ... [a defendant's]
testimony at trial.., are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used
without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement." Id. at 230-31 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966)).
35. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
36. Id. at 715-16.
July 1992] 1307
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lation because they risk losing "incriminating evidence for their case in
chief."37 On the other hand, as the Court itself noted, "when proper Mi-
randa warnings have been given, and the officer then continues his interroga-
tion after the suspect asks for an attorney, the officer may be said to have
little to lose and perhaps something to gain by way of possibly uncovering
impeachment material."'38 Thus, applying the exception to statements ob-
tained in these circumstances would provide the police with "almost no in-
centive for following Miranda's requirement that [interrogation be
ceased]." '39
The Court framed the question as the admissibility of Hass's statements
"solely for impeachment purposes" and found little distinction between the
principles announced in Harris and those required in Hass's case.40 Con-
ceiving that Harris had struck a "balance" between the costs of admission
and the costs of exclusion, the Court found that this balance controlled Hass
as well, and allowed the prosecution to use its illegally obtained evidence. 41
Although conceding the Oregon court's view that a police officer might
"have little to lose and perhaps something to gain"42 if the interrogation
were improperly continued, the Court declined to accept Justice Brennan's
prediction that "police interrogation will doubtless be vigorously pressed to
obtain statements before the attorney arrives." 43 The Court noted that po-
lice would gain as much, if not more, useful evidence from defective warn-
ings as they would from continued interrogation after providing adequate
warning.44 Thus, whether a substantial number of additional violations
would be encouraged by the impeachment exception in this new context was
necessarily speculative.45 The Court concluded that the speculative possibil-
ity that Hass, unlike Harris, would encourage routine Miranda violations did
not justify exceeding the level of deterrence already provided in Harris,
which prohibited the use of illegally obtained evidence in the prosecution's
case-in-chief.46
37. Id. at 718 (quoting Oregon v. Hass, 267 Or. 489, 492, 517 P.2d 671, 673 (1973)).
38. Id. at 723.
39. Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 715, 722.
41. Id. at 723-24.
42. Id. at 723.
43. Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 723.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 722-23. The Court applied a similar analysis to a Sixth Amendment case in
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990). Police contacted Harvey in jail, after he was indicted and
represented by counsel, eliciting a statement from him in violation of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.
625 (1986), by leading him to believe that his lawyer's presence was unnecessary. Harvey, 494 U.S.
at 346. According to Justice Stevens's dissent,
[t]he police would have everything to gain and nothing to lose by repeatedly visiting with
the defendant and seeking to elicit as many comments as possible about the pending trial.
Knowledge that such conversations could not be used affirmatively would not detract from
the State's interest in obtaining them for their value as impeachment evidence.
Id. at 365 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Relying on Hass, the Court dismissed the prospect of deterrence
of future violations as merely a "speculative possibility" and thus outweighed by the "search for
truth in a criminal case." Id. at 351-52 (quoting Hass, 420 U.S at 722, 723).
1308 [Vol. 44:1301
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After the creation of the impeachment exception in Walder, and the abo-
lition of the collateral use doctrine in Harris, Agnello's life hung by a single
thread. While able to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach a defend-
ant's direct testimony, the prosecution could not "smuggle in" such evidence
via cross-examination. The Court delivered the death blow in United States
v. Havens,4 7 when it returned to the Fourth Amendment context and consid-
ered whether the impeachment exception should permit illegally seized evi-
dence "to impeach a defendant's false trial testimony, given in response to
proper cross-examination, where the evidence does not squarely contradict
the defendant's testimony on direct examination. '4 8 A prosecution witness,
allegedly Havens's co-venturer, testified that Havens had helped him use al-
tered T-shirts, with drugs sewn into makeshift "pockets," to smuggle her-
oin. 49 On direct examination, Havens denied assisting the witness in
smuggling the heroin and altering the T-shirts.50 On cross-examination, the
prosecutor again elicited the defendant's denials but then elicited that
Havens's suitcase had contained the remaining cloth from the T-shirts used
to construct the pockets. 5 1 The prosecutor was thus able to introduce the T-
shirts even though they had previously been suppressed as the fruit of an
illegal search.52
The Court thus extended the impeachment exception to cover "a defend-
ant's statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably
suggested by the defendant's direct examination. '5 3 It reasoned that "[t]he
defendant's obligation to testify truthfully" does not vary according to
whether his testimony is given on direct or cross-examination, and that
prohibiting impeachment of testimony elicited on cross-examination "plainly
within the scope of the defendant's direct examination" would "severely im-
pede[]" the truth-seeking function of cross-examination. 54 Accordingly, the
Court expanded the exception to permit any use of the evidence, on the pros-
ecution's "direct case, or otherwise," on condition that it not be used "as
substantive evidence of guilt."15 5 Finally, despite finding that Agnello had
largely been overruled, the Court also suggested that it might be distinguish-
able from Havens. The "close relationship" between Havens's direct exami-
nation and the suppressed proof would have suggested the challenged
questions to any reasonably competent cross-examiner, while the prosecutor
in Agnello had sought to use Agnello's cross-examination to "smuggle in"
47. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
48. Id. at 621.
49. Id. at 622.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 622-23.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 627.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 628. The injunction against using the proof "substantively" to prove guilt purported
to reaffirm the balance of truth-seeking and deterrence established by prohibiting the use of illegally
obtained evidence on the prosecution's case-in-chief. The idea was that, insofar as the evidence was
used solely for impeachment purposes, it was not being used to improperly enhance the prosecution's
case-in-chief, even if the prosecutor had elicited the proof via cross-examination.
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the suppressed proof 5 6
Justice Brennan's dissent rightly rejected any distinction between Havens
and Agnello "turning upon the tenuity of the link between the cross-exami-
nation involved . .. and the subject matter of the direct examination." 57
After all, Agnello's professed ignorance that he was transporting cocaine
reasonably suggested cross-examination about his prior possession of cocaine
to establish that knowledge.5 8
Thus, despite the majority's denials, the pre-James evolution of the im-
peachment exception completed the destruction of Agnello. Throughout this
evolution, two models for determining the scope of the impeachment excep-
tion can be seen at work. The currently dominant one, originating in Harris,
seeks a balance between deterrence and truth-seeking. This "policy" ap-
proach conceives that the exclusionary rules promote constitutional rights
by deterring police violations; the exception promotes the ability of the
factfinding process to determine the truth; and the extent to which the ex-
ception permits the use of illegally obtained evidence at trial depends upon
the appropriate balance between these two goals. In applying that balance,
the Court has consistently equated the integrity of the factfinding process in
a criminal trial with the accuracy of that process, repeatedly noting that
"[t]here is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of
our legal system."5 9
The second model derives from the Court's distinction between the pros-
ecution's affirmative use of unlawfully obtained evidence and the defendant's
affirmative use of perjurious testimony in reliance on the "shield" of the ex-
clusionary rules. 60 The scope of the exception implicates principles holding
that both perjury and conviction with illegally obtained proof violate the
integrity of the factfinding process, apart from the policy discussion balanc-
ing the deterrence of future violations against the accuracy of factfinding.
Although no longer dominant, this approach continues to influence argu-
ments about the appropriate scope of the exception.
II. POLICIES: DETERRENCE VERSUS TRUTH-SEEKING
In the recent case of James v. Illinois, the Court considered whether to
extend the impeachment exception to the testimony of defense witnesses. 61
Earlier cases permitted illegally obtained evidence only to impeach the testi-
mony of the defendant himself.62 Thus, the question in James was whether
the Court would cross the implicit boundary of its previous cases.
56. Id. at 625.
57. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 630-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. See, eg., James v Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) (quoting Havens, 446 U.S. at 626); see
also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975).
60. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
61. See James, 493 U.S. at 309.
62. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (rejecting requirement that illegally
obtained evidence be "collateral" to the crime charged in order to be admitted under the exception);
Hass, 420 U.S. at 721-23 (applying exception to evidence obtained after defendant requested coun-
1310 [Vol. 44:1301
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In its case-in-chief at James's murder trial, the prosecution introduced
testimony of several eyewitnesses, who identified James as having shot the
victim. 63 Each of the eyewitnesses testified that the shooter had shoulder-
length "reddish" hair worn in a slicked-back "butter" style.64 They claimed
to recognize James as the shooter because they had seen him at a parade
several weeks before the shooting.6 5 At trial, however, James's hair was
black and worn in a "natural" style.66 A defense witness testified that James
also wore short black hair on the night of the crime.67 In rebuttal, the prose-
cution introduced James's statement, originally suppressed as a fruit of his
unlawful arrest, in which he acknowledged that he had had long reddish hair
on the night of the shooting.6 8
Applying the truth-seeking/deterrence balancing test,69 a bare majority
of the Court reversed the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court and ex-
cluded the defendant's statement.70 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, held that the prosecution may only use suppressed evidence to im-
peach the testimony of a defendant and not that of a defense witness.71 Jus-
tice Kennedy, joined by three other members of the Court, applied the same
test in his dissent,72 but concluded that the illegally obtained evidence had
been properly admitted.73
A close examination of the majority and dissenting opinions reveals that
both are unable to reach their preferred results without making internally
inconsistent claims.74 Moreover, both opinions are inconsistent with argu-
sel); Havens, 446 U.S. at 625-28 (applying exception to permit impeachment of defendant's testi-
mony on cross-examination).
However, several lower courts had assumed the exception to apply equally to the impeachment
of defense witnesses. See, eg., United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1224-25 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); Jacks v. Duckworth, 486 F Supp. 1366 (N.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd, 651 F.2d
480 (7th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982); see also note 192 infra (citing cases in which
courts admitted suppressed proof to contradict defense counsel's misleading cross-examination or
argument).
63. James, 493 U.S. at 310.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The defendant had successfully suppressed this statement, made at the time of his
arrest, because the arresting officers had no warrants and lacked probable cause for his warrantless
arrest. Id. at 309-10.
69. See id. at 312 n.l (noting that the Court must balance the likelihood of deterrence against
the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process) (citing Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987)).
70. Id. at 309.
71. Id. at 319-20.
72. Id at 324-25 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
74. This approach is consistent with the development of an internal critique that analyzes the
impeachment exception's ability to accomplish the goals its proponents have established for it. In
contrast, several commentators have criticized the Court's balancing approach with respect to the
exclusionary rules on the ground that the values that it purports to balance are incommensurate. See
Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48
IND. L.J. 329, 332-33 (1973); Kamisar, supra note 33, at 646; James Boyd White, Forgotten Points in
the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1281-82 (1983); see also United States v.
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ments that had informed the Court's previous application of the balance.
A. The Indeterminate Application of the Truth-Seeking/Deterrence
Balance in James v. Illinois
1. The majority opinion.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan argued that extending the excep-
tion to include defense witnesses would reduce the likelihood of deterrence
without a compensating increase in accurate factfinding. 75 On the truth-
seeking side of the balance, Justice Brennan offered two arguments why im-
peaching defense witnesses was less likely to improve factfinding than im-
peaching defendants. First, defense witnesses have less at stake than
defendants and are less likely to offer perjured testimony.7 6 Second, because
defense witnesses are less subject to control by counsel, and may even be
hostile, defense counsel is more likely to forego calling such witnesses to
avoid the possibility that the witness's testimony will open the door to ime-
gally obtained proof.77 Thus, although applying the exception to the defend-
ant deters perjured testimony without discouraging truthful testimony,
applying it to defense witnesses would deter counsel from calling witnesses
who might give truthful, probative evidence.78
On the deterrence side of the balance, Justice Brennan argued that ex-
tending the exception would substantially increase the prosecution's incen-
tive to gather evidence illegally for use as impeachment proof. Recognizing
that such proof could deter the testimony of defense witnesses or impeach
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 942-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Despite their criticism, these commentators
do not demonstrate that it is impossible to develop a common denominator for truth-seeking and
deterrence that can properly balance the two goals. This fact has contributed to the Court's persis-
tent analysis of the issue in light of this trade-off. Cf Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 972-75 & n.203
(generalizing incomparability critique to balancing tests in general, but noting their tenacity because
"we seem regularly to reduce value choices to a single currency for comparison" and because "a
thoroughgoing commitment to an economic analysis" of constitutional law "could avoid the 'apples'
and 'oranges' problem"). Accordingly, the analysis in this article assumes that the benefits to truth-
seeking and deterrence can theoretically be measured in common coin, but questions whether such a
conception rationally informs decisions about the scope of the exception. For more on the difference
between the internal critique developed here and an external critique, see note 9 supra and accompa-
nying text.
75. For ease of reference, this article attributes the James Court's analysis to Justice Brennan,
the author of the majority opinion. I recognize that the need to maintain a majority made it impossi-
ble for Justice Brennan to express his preferred analysis. In a footnote, Justice Brennan noted that
he personally rejected the policy-based analysis of the impeachment exception that he employed in
James. James, 493 U.S. at 312 n.1. See generally WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGY 37-90 (1964) (describing how "marshalling the Court" to achieve desired results often
requires a Justice writing the Court's opinion to compromise his analysis). Thus, the reader should
understand the criticism of Justice Brennan's opinion in James to be part of the critique of the
policy-based approach, rather than a critique of Justice Brennan's preferred, principle-based ap-
proach to the impeachment exception. The critique of that approach-exemplified by Justice Bren-
nan's claim that principle can justify the limited impeachment exception created in Walder, see
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)-is developed in Part III
infra.
76. James, 493 U.S. at 314.
77. Id. at 315.
78. Id.
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that which is offered, the prosecution would have "little to lose and much to
gain" by obtaining it.79 In contrast, Justice Brennan argued, the existing
incentive to gather evidence with which to impeach the defendant is weak
because it relies on the unlikely predictions that the defendant will testify
and then inadvertently open the door to illegally obtained evidence.8 0 With
respect to defense witnesses, however, the "vastly increase[d] ... number of
occasions on which such evidence could be used" would lead the police to
"recognize that obtaining evidence through illegal means stacks the deck
heavily in the prosecution's favor."81 This added incentive, together with
the "chilling effect ... deter[ring] defendants from calling witnesses in the
first place, thereby keeping from the jury much probative exculpatory evi-
dence," led to the conclusion that applying the exception to defense wit-
nesses would reduce deterrence to a degree uncompensated by any related
increase in truth-seeking.82
Justice Brennan's arguments, however, did not adequately support his
conclusion. First, while it is true that a criminal defendant is more likely to
lie than a disinterested witness, Justice Brennan ignored the fact that a jury
is also less likely to believe a defendant's false testimony.8 3 A testifying de-
fendant's credibility is impeached by his interest in the trial's outcome even
before he utters a word. Prosecutors are routinely entitled to an instruction
reminding the jury to consider the defendant's unique interest in the trial's
outcome when evaluating his testimony. 84 Even where such an instruction is
not allowed, an acceptable argument to the factfinder can make the same
telling point.85
79. Id. at 318-19.
80. Id. at 317-18.
81. Id. at 318.
82. Id.
83. In more formal terms, the risk of an erroneous finding at trial comprises both the risk that
false testimony will occur and the risk that it will not be detected. The majority opinion, by focusing
on the reduced risk of error in defense witness testimony but ignoring the related increase in detec-
tion risk, failed to address the true issue-the net effect on trial accuracy of impeaching defense
witnesses.
84. See I LEONARD B. SAND, JOHN P. SIFFERT, WALTER P. LOUGHLIN & STEVEN A. REiss,
MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, 7.01, at 7-12 (1991) (Instruction 7-4). This
article will frequently refer to jury instructions as the best evidence available of existing beliefs about
the significance of different kinds of evidence in a criminal trial. These beliefs are often inconsistent
with those underlying the Court's reasoning about the appropriate scope of the impeachment excep-
tion. Although frequently overlooked in the theoretical law review literature, jury instructions are a
rich source of evidence reflecting trial lawyers' and judges' views about the kinds of assumptions
jurors are likely to bring to the evaluation of proof.
85. Judge Sand, in his excellent analysis ofjury instructions, notes that some circuits prefer no
separate instruction on the defendant's interest. Instead, they rely on an instruction referring gener-
ally to all interested witnesses. Id. at 7-12 to 7-13. But the reason that they do so is further evidence
of the defendant's automatic impeachment. These courts refuse a separate instruction because the
defendant's interest in the outcome of the case is so obvious that there is no need to highlight it for
the jury, which perhaps would prejudice the defendant. Thus, the courts agree upon the obvious and
unique impeachment of a defendant's testimony by his interest in the outcome. They disagree only
about the best way to remind the jury of that impeachment because of its possibly overwhelming
character.
Note that Judge Sand himself prefers the specific instruction because it contains balancing lan-
guage particularly tailored to the defendant. This balancing language should prevent the jury from
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Ironically, Justice Brennan's argument that defendants are far more
likely to lie itself assumed that a common sense evaluation of the defendant's
testimony would subject it to heightened scrutiny. If factfinders share his
less suspicious attitude toward defense witness testimony, assumed to be a
product of common sense-and there is no reason to suspect that the Court
has a monopoly on common sense-the lesser incentive to defense witness
perjury should also entail an increased likelihood that the unimpeached testi-
mony of a defense witness will be erroneously credited, even if it is false. By
disregarding the defendant's reduced credibility, Justice Brennan's opinion
also contradicted prior precedent. In previous impeachment exception
cases, the Court had consistently assumed defendant perjury if suppressed
evidence contradicted his testimony, demonstrating the skepticism one
might routinely expect with respect to a defendant's exculpatory testimony.
Although the James Court went out of its way to say that "nothing in the
record suggests that... [the defense witness] intentionally committed per-
jury,"86 the same thing could have been said of the defendant's testimony in
the earlier impeachment exception cases. Even if the illegally obtained evi-
dence admitted in those cases was credible and the defendant's testimony
was not, the discrepancies were as amenable to innocent explanations as
those in James. The Court's different attitudes reflect an evaluation of the
relative credibility of a defendant and a defense witness, rather than any-
thing "in the record."
Indeed, Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in James emphasized that
the factfinder should not assume that suppressed evidence impeaching a de-
fense witness's testimony implies either inaccuracy or perjury.87 This view
directly contradicted the assumption of intentional falsity that permeates the
Court's analysis when a defendant's testimony is similarly impeached. 88
Given the defense witness's greater credibility, one can even question
Justice Brennan's initial assumption that defense witnesses are less likely to
commit perjury than defendants. While having less incentive to perjure him-
self, a defense witness also has less expectation of detection and punishment.
Investigators, prosecutors, and grand jurors will likely share the Court's
more benign view toward a defense witness's contradicted testimony. Also,
rules permitting courts to take perjury into account at sentencing at least
partly counteract the defendant's comparatively greater temptation to per-
jure himself. A defendant, unlike a defense witness, can be punished for
perjury without indictment and trial.89 In addition, if the Court's attitude is
any indicator, trial courts will likely conclude that a defendant committed
perjury from the simple confluence of a jury's guilty verdict and the defend-
understanding the general interested witness charge as "an indication that the defendant's testimony
should be rejected since he or she has the strongest interest in the outcome of the case." Id. at 7-11.
86. James, 493 U.S. at 314 n.4.
87. Id. at 320-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
88. Cf id. at 314 n.4; text accompanying note 86 supra.
89. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 53-55 (1978).
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ant's exculpatory testimony. A defense witness on trial for perjury does not
face this automatic disadvantage.
Just as Justice Brennan's discussion of the relative likelihood of perjury
failed to demonstrate why impeachment of a defense witness's testimony is
less important to truth-seeking than impeachment of a defendant's testi-
mony, it highlighted the tenuous connection between preventing perjury-
that is, intentionally false testimony-and promoting truth-seeking. Even if
a court can distinguish perjured from merely false testimony, justifying the
impeachment exception as preventing or punishing perjured testimony is
simply not the same as justifying it as promoting truth-seeking. Honest er-
rors in testimony are an equal or greater impediment than perjury to discov-
ering the truth. Defense witnesses are an equally likely source of such errors
and should be equally impeachable on that basis. Any special concern about
perjured testimony, therefore, must respond to considerations apart from the
truth-seeking/deterrence balance.90
Justice Brennan's second truth-seeking argument fared no better. He ar-
gued that applying the exception to defense witnesses would deter defense
counsel from presenting "truthful and favorable testimony" for fear that
such testimony might invite introduction of suppressed proof.9 1 He con-
tended that this fear would not apply to defendant testimony because coun-
sel can coach the defendant to avert "opening the door to impeachment by
carefully avoiding any statements that directly contradict the suppressed evi-
dence." 92 But the argument failed to establish any connection between the
impeachment exception's "deterrence" of truthful testimony and the overall
accuracy of the factfinding process.
The argument failed to explain its premise that applying the exception to
defendants does not also deter truthful and favorable testimony because only
suppressed proof that "directly contradict[s]" the defendant's testimony
would be admitted. 93 Justice Brennan apparently intended the "direct con-
tradiction" requirement to express the requisite for a defendant's impeach-
ment after Havens. However, this proposition did not appear in Havens. In
that case, the Court permitted the prosecutor to establish a direct contradic-
tion through cross-examination reasonably related to the defendant's direct
testimony rather than requiring the defendant's direct testimony to directly
contradict the suppressed proof.94 Cross-examination would either elicit an
admission by the defendant or lay the predicate for admitting the evidence. 95
In the alternative, had the defendant "carefully avoided" opening the door
to the suppressed proof by saying nothing in "direct contradiction" with it,
90. These considerations are discussed in Part III. See text accompanying notes 209-267 infra.
91. James, 493 U.S. at 315.
92. Id. at 314.
93. Id. (arguing that applying impeachment exception to defendants "discourages perjured tes-
timony without discouraging truthful testimony").
94. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1980).
95. According to Justice Brennan's dissent in Havens, the reasonable relationship test would
routinely permit prosecutors to lay the predicate for admitting any relevant evidence. Id. at 631-32
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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then indeed he would have been deterred from testifying to (what may be)
truthful and favorable evidence as effectively as he would have been deterred
from offering that proof by calling a witness.96
Justice Brennan's assumption that defense witnesses are more likely than
defendants to be discouraged from offering truthful testimony is also ques-
tionable, considering the substantial costs that the Court has imposed upon
defendants' testimony in other contexts. In Luce v. United States,97 the
Court did not allow a nontestifying defendant to appeal a trial court's in
limine ruling, which would have permitted his impeachment with prior con-
victions, had he testified. Luce is far more likely to deter truthful testimony
than any version of the impeachment exception. Thus, if one were to choose
the more likely victim of this deterrence, one might choose the defendant's
testimony over that of his witness. Already subject to damaging impeach-
ment by his interest in the outcome and, perhaps, by prior convictions, the
defendant might more likely perceive the prospect of his additional impeach-
ment with suppressed proof as the marginal difference.
Even conceding Justice Brennan his premise that some truthful, proba-
tive defense witness testimony might be deterred, his argument nonetheless
failed to establish the necessary connection between the deterrence of that
testimony and the accuracy of factfinding. He offered no reason why the
combined effect of excluding the prosecution's proof and deterring the de-
fendant's proof would occasion a net loss in the accuracy of factfinding. The
impeachment exception only deters defense testimony if the defendant and
his counsel conclude that the costs of introducing the suppressed proof out-
weigh the benefits of the favorable testimony. Thus, the proposition that
deterred testimony ultimately impedes truth-seeking follows only from a fur-
ther assumption that the truth would be better served by considering the
favorable testimony and excluding the suppressed proof. This assumption
lacks foundation.
When the costs of admitting evidence to impeach a witness outweigh the
benefits of his favorable testimony, the resulting failure to call the witness
indicates that evidentiary processes are performing their truth-seeking func-
tion exactly as they should within the context of the adversary system. They
are encouraging the parties themselves to weigh inculpatory against exculpa-
96. For example, if Havens's direct testimony denying his assistance with the smuggling pock-
ets was only "indirectly" contradicted by the presence of the matching T-shirts in his luggage, then
Havens held that cross-examination about his possession of the T-shirts was permissible. That cross-
examination would have elicited either a denial of the T-shirts' presence sufficient to justify admis-
sion of the proof or an equally probative admission of their presence. On Justice Brennan's reading,
Havens might have been able to avoid opening the door to the proof by limiting his direct testimony
to a general denial of the charge. But this strategy would have prevented him from offering poten-
tially probative and truthful evidence, as was the case with respect to the defendant in James, who
might have been deterred from offering his witness's testimony about his hair color. As it turned
out, Havens testified that the T-shirts were in his suitcase without his knowledge. Accordingly, the
exception in Havens's case permitted his impeachment with the T-shirts and could easily be con-
strued as deterring his potentially probative and truthful testimony that he had "nothing to do" with
the creation or use of the smuggling pockets.
97. 469 U.S. 38, 41-43 (1984).
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tory proof. The defendant may suffer if a witness offering exculpatory testi-
mony also may invite impeachment with inculpatory suppressed evidence;
obviously he would be in a much better strategic position had the witness
presented no such liability. Although the operation of the exception in such
an instance may impair the defendant's ability to present a better defense, it
can hardly be blamed for impeding truth-seeking. After all, if impeachment
evidence is damning enough to deter witness testimony, that testimony is
probably false and the trial is better off without it. The adversarial system
and the rules of evidence are presumptively sufficient to ensure that the truth
prevails, without Justice Brennan's "tinkering."
98
Similarly, Justice Brennan's attempt to revive the "direct contradiction"
requirement for impeachment of defendant testimony99 bears no real rela-
tion to truth-seeking. 100 There is no reason to believe that carefully tailored
testimony, if offered by a defendant or his witness, furthers truth-seeking
when it is admitted without the benefit of excluded proof that even indirectly
contradicts the testimony. "Indirectly contradicting" proof will deter excul-
patory evidence only where it is more probative than the evidence foregone.
If the suppressed proof is less probative because it contradicts only "indi-
rectly," defense counsel will obviously not forego the witness's more proba-
tive exculpatory testimony in order to avoid the less probative contradictory
evidence. If the suppressed evidence is more probative, the decision to
forego the exculpatory proof for fear of opening the door to suppressed proof
again demonstrates that the adversarial factfinding process is working prop-
erly. Counsel's choice to forego the evidence to avoid even indirectly contra-
dicting proof is presumptively explained by the comparative probative value
of each. The relative value of the exculpatory and the contradicting proof,
not the direct or indirect relationship between the two, is the only factor
relevant to the accuracy of the factfinding process. l01
98. In the language of economics, the "free market" of the adversary system, established by
evidentiary rules, already promotes the truth, and there is no need for regulatory intervention to
achieve evidentiary goals.
99. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
100. Justice Brennan is not the only victim ensnared by this trap. The same erroneous equa-
tion of illegally obtained proof and inaccurate factfinding seems also to have informed the suggested
pre-Havens rule that impeachment of a defendant with illegally obtained proof be restricted to issues
initiated by the defendant on direct examination, lest he be deterred from offering "all of the relevant
evidence [that] is highly significant in accurate and just determinations." Volpicelli v. Salamack, 447
F. Supp. 652, 662 n.28 (S.D.N.Y.) (quoting 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 607[09], at 607-89 to 607-90 (1977)), aff'd without op., 578 F.2d 1372 (2d
Cir. 1978).
The framers of this rule were no better able to explain how accuracy resulted from freeing a
defendant's or a defense witness's testimony from the deterring effect of reliable, contradicting proof
only if it had been illegally obtained. The makers of the argument, like Justice Brennan in James,
were proponents of the exclusionary rules, who, in light of the established doctrine, perhaps felt
compelled to disguise, however transparently, a "justice" argument for limiting the impeachment
exception's incursion into those rules as an argument for accurate factfinding.
101. For example, where the rules of evidence would permit Havens's impeachment with "in-
directly contradicting" proof of the T-shirts in his suitcase, it is undoubtedly because introducing the
proof is in the interest of accurate factfinding. Similarly, where evidentiary rules would permit the
defense witness testimony about James's appearance to be impeached with James's directly contrary
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Justice Brennan's opinion also failed to properly distinguish between the
impeachment of defendants and defense witnesses from a deterrence per-
spective. First, its prediction that the incentive to gather evidence illegally
would substantially increase because that evidence would be useful in dis-
couraging or damaging defense witness testimony relied upon the faulty
premise that the existing incentive to impeach or deter defendants' testimony
is relatively weak.102 Second, even assuming Justice Brennan's conclusion
that applying the exception to defense witnesses would increase the police
incentive to gather evidence unlawfully, his argument did not demonstrate a
relationship between this increased incentive and the resulting, but suppos-
edly minimal, gain to the accuracy of the truth-seeking process.
Justice Brennan's argument assumed that law enforcement officials
would refrain from illegal actions specifically because they would know that
any resulting evidence could be used only to impeach a defendant and not a
defense witness. But the likelihood that this knowledge would play a sub-
stantial role in police decisionmaking is exceedingly remote. The anticipa-
tion that illegally obtained proof can impeach the defendant's testimony
already provides sufficient incentive to obtain such proof routinely. Justice
Brennan portrayed this incentive as "weak" by arguing that the prosecution
would discount the anticipated utility of the proof by the unlikelihood that a
defendant would both testify and open the door to admission of the proof.
However, as his own analysis of defense witness testimony illustrated, ille-
gally obtained proof is useful to deter defense evidence even where it is not
admitted. That argument applies with equal force to a defendant's testi-
mony, and provides the prosecution with ample incentive to obtain impeach-
ing proof routinely.103
Moreover, the prosecution's incentive to acquire impeachment proof
does not depend upon its prediction of the defendant's defense strategy. In-
stead, the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial governs its accumulation of evidence. 1 4 However the prose-
cution contemplates the defendant's potential strategy, the need to anticipate
those possibilities and to gather evidence sufficient to counter them is largely
admission, they again promote accurate factfinding. Had the evidence been lawfully obtained, it
would not have been blamed for impeding the search for truth by dissuading defense counsel from
presenting proof that was less probative than the impeaching evidence. The illegal nature of evi-
dence or whether it directly or indirectly contradicts the defense, is irrelevant to factfinding
accuracy.
102. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 318 (1990).
103. Moreover, there is no reason to suspect that deterring the defendant's testimony will fur-
ther truth-seeking, while deterring the defense witnesses' testimony will impede it.
104. Anyone who has participated in the criminal trial process, as an attorney, investigator,
juror, or observer should recognize this process immediately. Indeed, the goal of a criminal investi-
gation is to produce the evidence on which persuasive argument and ultimately the desired verdict
can be based, all with an eye to eliminating reasonable possibilities other than that of the guilt of the
defendant. Cf ROGER FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICr FOR BEGINNERS 1-26 (1969) (noting
that effective persuasion requires an advocate first to understand the choices facing decisionmakers
as they understand them and then to change those choices in a fashion that makes it easier for them
to choose the desired alternative).
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the same.10 5 The prosecution may contemplate that defense counsel will ex-
ploit gaps in the prosecution's proof without presenting any defense evi-
dence, or will present evidence in the form of a defendant's or a defense
witness's testimony, or will mount a defense via cross-examination of prose-
cution witnesses. Anticipating how the defense will present its case, how-
ever, is less important than anticipating the potential defense itself and
gathering evidence to defeat it. Accordingly, any distinctions in the incen-
tive to unlawful evidence-gathering which depend upon predictions about
the precise means the defendant will use to present his defense, rather than
the substance of the defense itself, are likely to be de minimis.
The structure of a criminal trial assures that the prosecution will antici-
pate all reasonable defenses10 6 that might be advanced, rather than assume
an advantage from the defendant's failure to offer independent proof. The
courts must caution juries against drawing any inferences from a defendant's
failure to offer an explanation for the prosecution's proof,10 7 and prohibit
prosecutors from making adverse comments in response to such failures.10 8
A competent prosecutor or police officer would be aware of such cautionary
instructions, and thus would not fail to accumulate evidence disproving an-
ticipated defenses, including one based entirely on the prosecution's failure
to overcome the presumption of innocence. The potential importance that
evidence has for obtaining a conviction will likely determine the prosecu-
tion's incentive to obtain it.
The need to anticipate the substance of the defense dwarfs any prediction
of the means by which the defendant will present that defense as a result of
additional features of a criminal trial. In virtually all cases, the prosecution
will not know how the defendant will present his defense until the trial un-
folds. Some disclosure requirements preclude the use of certain defenses or
defense witnesses if not revealed shortly prior to trial,10 9 but the prosecution
is unlikely to await that disclosure before gathering proof. Moreover, the
defendant does not waive his right to present any other permissible defenses
105. I should note here that violations giving rise to exclusion are not the exclusive province of
the police, although for ease of reference the article will sometimes refer to "police" as well as
"prosecution" violations. Of course, the police will operate in a variety of supervised and un-
supervised settings. The degree and type of supervision will itself be partially a function of the scope
of the exclusionary rules and the impeachment exception. Thus, the argument in the text generally
refers to the prosecution in order to encompass all of these situations.
Anyone who has ever participated in preparing a prosecution will likely recognize the relative
insignificance of anticipating the precise way in which the defense will be presented. Investigation
and trial preparation can be described as a conversation structured around questions such as: "What
is our answer, in proof and/or argument, if he or she says this?" Prosecutors pay relatively little
attention to whether the unidentified "he or she" saying these posited things is the defendant, de-
fense counsel, or a defense witness, unless all three contingencies are specifically planned for.
106. I use the term "defenses" in its nontechnical sense to refer to any innocent explanations of
the prosecution's proof.
107. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981); see also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478
(1978) (holding that the trial court's refusal to give the defendant's requested instruction on the
presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial).
108. See Griffin v. Illinois, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
109. See, eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2).
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or witnesses without disclosure.' 10 In addition, although revealing the iden-
tities of defense witnesses is required in some jurisdictions, disclosing the
substance of their anticipated testimony is not.11 1
Of course, the prosecution may plan for alternative presentation strate-
gies in addition to planning for the defense itself. However, because prosecu-
tors rarely know the identity of defense witnesses in advance, they can only
anticipate the testimony of the defendant. He is the person most likely to be
present at trial, and he has the greatest interest in its outcome. Moreover, it
is the rare defense that can be presented only by the testimony of a defense
witness. Most, if not all, defenses can also be established by the defendant's
testimony alone. By anticipating the defendant's possible testimony, the
prosecution already anticipates any other defense evidence, including the tes-
timony of defense witnesses. Any additional deterrence gained by not apply-
ing the impeachment exception to defense witnesses must therefore be
insignificant, considering the existing incentives to obtain proof to contradict
or foreclose any defenses available by way of argument, cross-examination,
or defendant testimony.
Even in the limiting case where the prosecution anticipates the testimony
of a particular defense witness, knows the substance of that testimony, and
illegally obtains evidence specifically to impeach that testimony, "standing"
doctrine suppresses that evidence only if the illegal action violates the rights
of the defendant. 112 It is extremely unlikely that the prospect of using evi-
dence to impeach a defense witness would tip the scales in favor of violating
a defendant's rights, because the police already have enough to gain by using
illegal evidence to impeach the defendant. Consequently, extending the im-
peachment exception to defense witnesses would provide little additional in-
centive to gather proof unlawfully.
Even if there were an increased incentive to unlawful action, Justice
Brennan failed to explain why this loss to deterrence would not be out-
weighed by the concomitant gain in factfinding accuracy. In fact, common
sense suggests the opposite result. The most plausible explanation for any
difference in the behavior of the prosecution, when permitted to impeach
defense witnesses, as well as defendants, with illegal proof, is its realization
that a defense witness's exculpatory testimony is far more damaging to its
case than a defendant's exculpatory testimony. Suppose, for example, that
the prosecution routinely refrained from obtaining illegal proof to contradict
a defendant's anticipated testimony that he was not at the scene of the crime,
but routinely obtained illegal contradicting proof when it anticipated that an
alibi witness would establish the same defense. The presumptive explanation
for the prosecution's behavior is the more probative character of the latter
proof. Excluding impeachment evidence would thus impair factfinding ac-
110. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b).
111. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 413(d)(i) (Smith-Hurd 1985) (Supreme Court
Rule 413).
112. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and
the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1593 (1987).
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curacy to a greater degree when the proof contradicts defense witness testi-
mony, than when it contradicts defendant testimony. Any increased
incentive resulting from the extension of the exception to defense witnesses
would occur precisely because juries are more likely to believe the testimony
of defense witnesses, in the absence of the contradicting proof, than the testi-
mony of the defendant. Consequently, the factfinding costs of not extending
the exception would exceed any imagined benefits to deterrence.
In sum, Justice Brennan failed to demonstrate that the lost deterrence
that results from extending the impeachment exception to defense witnesses
would outweigh the gain to truth-seeking. His contention that defense wit-
nesses are less likely to lie overlooked the reality that, since a defense wit-
ness's false testimony is more likely to be believed, its impeachment is more
important to truth-seeking. His argument that the impeachment of defense
witnesses, but not defendants, would deter probative defense evidence failed
to explain why defendants are not similarly deterred from testifying, or how
the admission of otherwise legitimate proof that was illegally obtained,
would impair truth-seeking. His argument that extending the exception
would substantially increase the incentive to gather evidence illegally ig-
nored existing incentives to gather proof to impeach defendants. Finally,
Justice Brennan's argument that this reduced deterrence outweighs the re-
lated increase in accurate factfinding ignored the fact that any increased in-
centive for illegal evidence-gathering would result precisely from its greater
contribution to truth-seeking.
2. The dissent.
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion concluded that the benefits to "the
truth-seeking function of the criminal trial" of applying the exception to de-
fense witnesses outweigh any costs to Fourth Amendment protections.1 13
On the truth-seeking side of the balance, he correctly observed that a defense
witness's lack of interest gives his testimony "greater potential to deceive"
than a defendant's, and that courts cannot realistically rely on the threat of a
perjury prosecution to prevent such deceit. 114 He also realized that "[t]he
damage to the truth-seeking process ... is certain to be great whether the
testimony is perjured or merely false."115 Moreover, the prosecution's si-
lence in the face of exculpatory defense witness testimony is likely to bolster
that testimony because "Ij]urors will assume that if the prosecution had any
proof the statement was false, it would make the proof known." 116
Notwithstanding these substantial benefits to truth-seeking, Justice
Kennedy only partially endorsed the extended application of the impeach-
ment exception to defense witnesses. He conceded that deterrence would be
inadequate if "a single slip of the tongue by any defense witness will open the
113. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 322 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 325, 326-27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 325 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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door to any suppressed evidence at the prosecutor's disposal. ' 117 To avoid
this result, Justice Kennedy proposed that the exception apply to defense
witnesses only in "situations where there is direct conflict, which is to say
where, within reason, the witness' testimony and the excluded testimony
cannot both be true."118 He also suggested that it might be necessary to
permit only the contradiction of the witness's direct testimony to avoid the
possibility that the prosecution would use clever cross-examination to intro-
duce excluded evidence.119 Only applied with these restrictions, Justice
Kennedy concluded, would the gains to truth-seeking occasioned by the ex-
tended exception justify the related loss to deterrence. 120
Justice Kennedy was as unsuccessful as the majority in distinguishing the
impeachment of defense witnesses from that of defendants. Although he ar-
gued that limitations on the impeachment of defense witnesses were neces-
sary to confine the incentive to gather proof illegally to an acceptable level,
Justice Kennedy was unable to explain why identical restrictions should not
also be applied to the impeachment of defendants. Alternatively, if the im-
peachment of defendants should not be restricted, then such restrictions are
similarly unnecessary to protect defense witnesses. As a result, Justice Ken-
nedy could not demonstrate that extending the exception as he proposed
would effect net gains, just as the majority could not demonstrate that its
result would effect net losses when both truth-seeking and deterrence costs
were tallied.
Justice Kennedy's argument that restrictions were uniquely necessary to
the impeachment of defense witnesses must have conceded that no such re-
strictions applied to the impeachment of defendants. Otherwise, his propos-
als would have been superfluous. He thus must have recognized that the
Havens Court, by permitting impeachment of any cross-examination "rea-
sonably suggested" by direct testimony,121 effectively eliminated any re-
quirement of a direct contradiction between the defendant's testimony and
the prosecution's suppressed proof.122 Recognizing that the exception al-
ready permitted the impeachment of defendants' testimony with illegally ob-
tained evidence merely in tension with that testimony, Justice Kennedy had
to explain why this lenient approach should not also apply to defense wit-
nesses. However, neither his truth-seeking nor his deterrence arguments
supported more restrictive rules for impeaching defense witnesses; if any-
thing, they argued for more leniency.
Justice Kennedy's truth-seeking analysis contended that contradiction
of defense witness testimony is particularly important because juries are
more likely to believe such testimony.123 If it is more important to the accu-
117. Id. at 328-29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 325 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 329 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
121. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980).
122. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
123. James, 493 U.S. at 324-25 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1322 [Vol. 44:1301
THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
racy of the factfinding process, witness testimony should be more readily
impeached than that of defendants. Accordingly, the rules for witness im-
peachment should be more lenient, not more restrictive, than those applied
to a defendant's testimony.
Justice Kennedy's deterrence argument was equally unenlightening. It is
more important to restrict the prosecution's ability to contradict a defend-
ant's testimony than that of a defense witness, because the defendant's testi-
mony is more likely to be anticipated. Moreover, if the prosecution
anticipates possible defenses, rather than the testimony of a specific witness,
then the notion that the prosecution has different incentives to obtain evi-
dence contradicting the testimony of defendants and defense witnesses can-
not be justified. In either event, Justice Kennedy could not justify, for
deterrence reasons rather than truth-seeking reasons, rules that protect de-
fense witnesses' testimony more than defendants' testimony.
Rather than make any arguments of his own to support a stricter stan-
dard for impeachment of defense witnesses, Justice Kennedy implicitly con-
ceded the majority's points at the same time as he explicitly rebutted them.
Accordingly, each of the central points of his opinion contradicted itself. To
justify his proposed limitations, Justice Kennedy implicitly accepted the ma-
jority's claim that defense counsel exercises less control over a defense wit-
ness's testimony than over the defendant's.' 24 Consequently, because a
witness's "slip of the tongue" during cross-examination, or testimony in
mere tension with suppressed proof, might open the door to illegally ob-
tained evidence, the defense is less likely to call that witness.' 2 5 But Justice
Kennedy then discounted the effect of lack of control over defense witness
testimony on deterrence, claiming that a police officer "certainly will not
know anything about potential defense witnesses, much less what the con-
tent of their testimony might be."' 26
However, this argument proved too much. Having established the slim
likelihood of anticipating a particular defense witness's testimony, Justice
Kennedy could hardly depict that likelihood as a substantial additional in-
centive to violate the defendant's rights. Moreover, if that additional incen-
tive is minimal, it cannot overcome the effect of exclusion on factfinding
accuracy to the extent necessary to justify unique restrictions on the im-
peachment of defense witness testimony.
Justice Kennedy's deterrence analysis thus did not support his limita-
tions on the impeachment of defense witnesses. To avoid the implications of
that conclusion, he had to rely on a truth-seeking argument and conceive of
impeachment of defense witnesses as less important to truth-seeking than
impeachment of defendants. In so doing, he had to concede the majority's
argument that defense witness testimony would more likely be truthful than
that of the defendant. But this concession contradicted his earlier argument
124. Id. at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
125, Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 329 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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for the special importance of impeaching defense witnesses; that is, whether
perjured or merely false, unrebutted witness testimony is far more likely to
be believed than the testimony of the defendant.' 27
Justice Kennedy was no more able than the majority to rationalize the
feared loss to truth-seeking if the impeachment exception discourages the
defendant from presenting his witnesses.128 If defense counsel does not call
a witness because she believes that the witness's testimony would result in
the admission of more probative inculpatory evidence than probative excul-
patory evidence, the failure to call the witness would occasion no net loss to
truth-seeking, except insofar as the exclusionary rules and the adversary sys-
tem deny the prosecution its more probative contradicting proof. Although
the ability to present exculpatory proof free from the threat of the introduc-
tion of more probative contradicting evidence might be desirable to the de-
fendant, it no more serves truth-seeking in Justice Kennedy's analysis than it
does in that of Justice Brennan.
Because truth-seeking would be substantially advanced even without Jus-
tice Kennedy's proposed limitations on the contradiction of defense witness
testimony, he could not explain why the minimal loss to deterrence was not
clearly outweighed by the gain to accurate factfinding. The police were no
more thinking about specifically deterring the potential testimony of defense
witnesses than they were thinking about obtaining evidence specifically to
contradict it. Moreover, even if Justice Kennedy had attempted to explain
the deterrent effect of his proposed limitations, his analysis would not have
permitted him to do so. If the police were thinking about illegally obtaining
proof to contradict or deter anticipated defense witness testimony, their ra-
tional response to a requirement that the proof be "directly contradictory"
would be to obtain more such evidence. The more illegal evidence obtained
for potential impeachment, the more likely it is that some of it will directly
contradict the defense case and thus be admissible. Similarly, the more ex-
tensive the impeachment evidence available, the more likely it is to benefit
the prosecution by deterring the presentation of defense evidence.
Justice Kennedy's direct contradiction requirement resulted less from
the logic of truth-seeking and deterrence than from the implications of the
127. Similarly, Justice Kennedy's response to the Court's claim that the threat of prosecution
would deter defense witnesses from engaging in perjury was self-contradictory. On the one hand,
Justice Kennedy complained that the threat of prosecution was ineffective because of the difficulty in
prosecuting perjury. Id. at 326-27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But on the other hand, if the prosecu-
tor could impeach defense witnesses with only directly contradicting proof, as Justice Kennedy sug-
gested, defense counsel might be able to assure that the witness testifies to matters only "indirectly"
contradicted by the proof. Prohibiting the defense witness from being cross-examined under oath
about evidence that is "in tension" with, but not directly contradictory to, his testimony will make
perjury prosecutions of defense witnesses virtually impossible. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy's ap-
proach would have increased the likelihood of perjured defense witness testimony, while proceeding
on the assumption that existing disincentives to offering such testimony were inadequate. Also, if
Justice Kennedy thought that the "direct contradiction" requirement would permit only false, but
not perjured defense witness testimony, his own analysis established that nothing from the perspec-
tive of truth-seeking could possibly support the admission of false testimony from witnesses whose
uncontradicted, less-interested testimony is likely to be credited.
128. See notes 99-101 supra and accompanying text.
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Court's cumulative extension of the exception. Dismissing the "majority's
fear that allowing the jury to know the whole truth will chill defendants
from putting on any defense" as speculative, 129 Justice Kennedy ignored
whether the balancing test developed by the Court might properly urge such
a result. Justice Kennedy's limitations on defense witness impeachment con-
nected just as tenuously to truth-seeking as the majority connected truth-
seeking to the prevention of knowingly false testimony.
Justice Kennedy's proposed limitations may have been at least partly
motivated by the majority's concern that impeachment of defense witnesses
might foreclose all potential defenses. 130 But he could not explain why even
the absolute foreclosure of a meaningful defense case was not perfectly con-
sistent with the theory that the impeachment exception preserves the proper
balance between truth-seeking and deterrence. Suppose that a defendant
could not present a meaningful defense without opening the door to illegally
obtained evidence, because there is an abundance of probative evidence
against the defendant that would be perfectly admissible under the impeach-
ment exception. Truth-seeking analysis suggests no reason to permit the de-
fendant to present any false defenses.131 Thus, absolute foreclosure does not
appear to be any less appropriate than the partial foreclosure of only some
false defenses. The only difference is that in the former situation, there is
more probative evidence against the defendant. Truth-seeking does not dis-
tinguish among false defenses with respect to whether they leave the defend-
ant an equally false alternative.
Similarly, the assumption that the exclusionary rules will have a suffi-
cient deterrent effect despite the impeachment exception-because the prose-
cution still must obtain evidence for its case-in-chief--does not indicate that
absolute foreclosure of defenses is inconsistent with appropriate deterrence.
The prosecution always has an incentive to eliminate all potential defenses,
even though it cannot establish its case-in-chief with unlawfully obtained
evidence. Thus, adequate deterrence, as depicted by both the Court and Jus-
tice Kennedy, does not depend upon whether a potential defense is likely to
be successful if not foreclosed or contradicted. The possibility of absolute
foreclosure arises because the exception protects accurate factfinding and the
prosecution possesses proof that effectively contradicts potential defenses,
not because of any improper sacrifice of deterrence to truth-seeking.
The attempts by both the Court and Justice Kennedy to apply the bal-
ancing analysis to the impeachment of defense witnesses were, therefore, ut-
terly indeterminate. Every argument that supported the extension, by
depicting the extension's gain to truth-seeking as relatively large and the loss
to deterrence as relatively small, generated an opposite argument that re-
versed its conclusion. This reversal occurred because the same arguments
that established a large gain to truth-seeking in fact also established an
129. James, 493 U.S. at 325 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
130. See id at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 313-19 (confusing defendant's right to present "best" or "any" defense with
right to present it without fear of contradiction by probative, reliable evidence).
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equally large loss to deterrence. Similarly, the same arguments that sug-
gested a small loss to deterrence actually established an equally small gain to
truth-seeking. To manipulate their analyses to yield a result at all, the ma-
jority and the dissent selectively ignored the implications of their most im-
portant arguments. Both the Brennan and Kennedy opinions, therefore,
emerge as studies in self-contradiction.
B. The Incoherence of the Truth-Seeking/Deterrence Balance: The
Court's Evidentiary Approach
The opinions in James failed to offer consistent arguments supporting
their respective answers to the question of how extending the impeachment
exception to defense witnesses would influence the truth-seeking/deterrence
balance. That failure results from the inadequacy of the analysis, rather
than from any unique difficulty in applying the analysis to that particular
issue. The critical question raised by alternatives for defining the boundaries
of the exception is whether adopting those boundaries yields net gains to
truth-seeking or deterrence, considering that the scope of the exception af-
fects values on both sides of the balance. To resolve any boundary issue, the
balancing analysis must encompass a theory of how the effect on deterrence
of admitting illegally obtained evidence varies independently from the re-
lated effect on truth-seeking.
Without a theory of how the variables in the balance vary independently,
the degree of deterrence accomplished will always be inversely proportionate
to the degree of truth-seeking achieved. Just as the extent to which the ex-
ception promotes truth-seeking will be measured by the extent to which it
permits the use of illegally obtained evidence, the extent to which the exclu-
sionary rules deter will be measured by the extent to which they prohibit the
use of illegally obtained evidence. Hence, absent a theory of independent
variation, truth-seeking and deterrence will always be in equipoise; the no-
tion of a balance between truth-seeking and deterrence will describe every
point on the continuum between complete admission and complete exclu-
sion. However, this notion of the balance will not differentiate among defini-
tions of the scope of the impeachment exception with respect to net gains to
truth-seeking or to deterrence. Consequently, this analysis will not provide a
framework for choosing among the different points on the continuum, each
of which could accurately be described as reflecting a balance between truth-
seeking and deterrence.1 32
As demonstrated by the internally inconsistent arguments in James, the
132. The point can be put in economic terms as follows: Even assuming the Court's starting
point on the scale of truth-seeking and deterrence can be expressed by cardinal numbers, its analysis
failed to provide a means of identifying whether a given change in the balance effects an efficient
alteration in the status quo, regardless of the criterion adopted to measure efficiency (Pareto-superi-
ority, Kaldor-Hicks, etc.). The Court's approach failed to provide the analysis necessary to express
the ordinal relationship between the two measures. The defect in the analysis, therefore, cannot be
cured by justifying a starting point. Thus, this article's critique of the balancing approach differs
from that often applied generally to efforts to justify legal rules by the efficiency criterion. Cf note
139 infra
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Court has been unable to offer a coherent theory of how extending the im-
peachment exception will impose costs and benefits that do not vary in in-
verse proportion to each other. Analyzing the exception's costs to
deterrence in light of the incentive to obtain proof illegally, both opinions in
James failed to demonstrate why that incentive will not be defined by the
probative value of the anticipated proof. The probative value of the illegally
obtained evidence will, therefore, define both its contribution to truth-seek-
ing and the prosecution's incentive to obtain it. Although the prosecution
will not have perfect knowledge of the evidence that unlawful investigative
efforts might produce, its estimate of the probative value of that proof will
determine its incentive to obtain it. If the evidence is less probative than
anticipated, or no evidence is obtained at all, then exclusion imposes no cost
other than the prosecution's inability to use it in its case-in-chief. Assuming
prosecutors to be informed, rational actors, the decision to make the illegal
search or seizure reflects a determination that the risk of losing the proof
with respect to the prosecution's case-in-chief is insufficient reason either to
forego the illegal procedure entirely or to conduct a completely lawful
investigation. 133
Prior to James, the starting point for the Court's analysis of the incentive
to obtain proof illegally was its claim that "sufficient deterrence flows when
the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in
chief." 134 But that claim does not explain how the incentive created by the
exception to gather proof illegally varies independently from the probative
value of the anticipated proof. Rather, it is only one point of many on the
truth-seeking/deterrence continuum. At best, it provides a foundation for
an analysis of the issue in James that, by purely circular reasoning, would
conclude that the exclusionary rules would unduly sacrifice truth-seeking to
deterrence 135 by preventing anything other than the prosecution's use of ille-
133. This determination also may be made in gross in decisions relating to the training of law
enforcement personnel and administrative penalties for violation of constitutional criminal
procedure.
134. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
135. See Comment, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, 104 HARv. L. REV. 43,
159-68 (1990). The comment's author fell precisely into the trap laid by the Court's analysis. The
author argued that the result in James could be attacked for purportedly departing from "prece-
dent." Id. at 166. On analysis, however, the precedent consists of the "theme" that "excluding
illegally obtained evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief adequately deters police miscon-
duct." Idr at 165. The author later acknowledged, however, that this "theme" serves to establish
that the "incremental loss in deterrence" from extending the exception to defense witnesses is de
minimis only if one concedes that the pre-existing boundaries of the exception owe nothing to deter-
rence since "officers already confront opportunities to violate the fourth amendment when they have
little to lose." Id. at 166. Thus, the precedent can establish no guiding "theme" unless it merely
assumes without explanation that the exception should be extended for some other reason. More-
over, the dissenters' conclusion has nothing to do with consistency of precedent. One can just as
easily have concluded with the majority that the relevant "theme" of the earlier cases limited im-
peachment only to a defendant's testimony for deterrence reasons. Using that "theme" as a starting
point, the "incremental loss in deterrence" in extending the exception to defense witnesses can be
perceived as that which makes all the difference in official conduct.
More generally, it is impossible to fall back onto a conception of what it means to prohibit the
use of evidence on the prosecution's case-in-chief without asking what that prohibition should mean
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gally obtained evidence to establish a legally sufficient case. 136
Such a result would reduce the truth-seeking/deterrence balance to mere
language expressing conclusions about the scope of the exception's bounda-
ries, rather than an analysis employed to reason about those boundaries.
Thankfully, the Court seems genuinely interested in avoiding that result, as
both James opinions rejected the "case-in-chief" starting point. The opin-
ions agree that excluding illegally-obtained evidence from the prosecution's
case-in-chief provides insufficient deterrence. 137 As both the majority and
dissenting opinions demonstrate, the Court is not prepared to accept the
consequences of that approach because it would permit the prosecution both
to anticipate the utility of illegally obtained proof to deter or contradict de-
fense evidence and to capitalize on that proof in every respect short of rely-
ing on it to establish the sufficiency of its case. 138
Rather than simply rely on the assumption of "sufficient deterrence" in
circular fashion, the Court has sought to establish boundaries capable of
more extensive deterrence-whether by prohibiting any use of the exception
to impeach defense witnesses or by limiting the impeachment of such wit-
nesses to directly contradictory proof of matters stated on direct examina-
tion-and has sought to justify those boundaries as consistent with the
appropriate balance between truth-seeking and deterrence. While the
Court's motives are commendable, its analysis is nonetheless misguided be-
cause it does not offer a theory of the independent variation of truth-seeking
and deterrence. Because neither Justice Brennan nor Justice Kennedy put
forth such a theory, their James opinions can be described as merely propos-
ing different balances between exclusion's costs to the truth and admission's
costs to deterrence. In fact, every result between the extremes of complete
exclusion and of admission for any purpose other than establishing the suffi-
ciency of the prosecution's case qualifies as a "balance" under their analyses.
By rejecting the case-in-chief analysis of past decisions, the Court has only
limited the range of possible outcomes. Where the incentive to obtain proof
illegally is directly proportional to its probative value, and its probative
value defines its contribution to truth-seeking, the incentive analysis cannot
inform the choice of the proper point within that range. 139
in this context and thus implicating the question of how the analysis makes ordinal judgments about
truth-seeking and deterrence. For example, the author of the comment assumed without discussion
that the prohibition does not foreclose the use of the evidence to rebut misleading cross-examination
or argument, regardless of whether the defendant presents any evidence at all. Simultaneously, how-
ever, the author appeared to endorse, by negative implication, the James dissenters' conclusion as
uniquely consistent with the theme of establishing a consistent prohibition against use of the evi-
dence in the prosecution's case-in-chief. Id. at 165 n.56. This reliance on precedent to support these
idiosyncratic and unexplained results illustrates the circularity of the analysis.
136. The difficulties in establishing what it means to prohibit the use of evidence on the prose-
cution's case-in-chief and the reason why such a prohibition amounts only to prohibiting the use of
the evidence to establish a legally sufficient case is discussed at text accompanying notes 229-267
infra.
137. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 318 (1990); see id. at 324 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 318; see id. at 324 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139. I do not mean to argue that truth-seeking and deterrence are necessarily inversely propor-
tionate to each other. Rather, I use the notion of inverse proportionality only to criticize the Court's
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Apparently attempting to remedy this deficiency, the Court tried to rely
on traditional evidentiary limitations as a source of inspiration. The Court
assumed that an appropriate conception of the limited evidentiary use of the
proof, in addition to its prohibition on the prosecution's case-in-chief, will
determine when the exception will yield a net gain to truth-seeking or deter-
rence. Within the framework provided by this shared assumption, the Court
has differed about the appropriate analogy between illegally obtained proof
and proof whose use is limited by evidentiary principles.
For example, in addition to selectively manipulating the truth-seeking/
deterrence balance, the majority and the dissent in James disputed the
proper understanding of the scope of the impeachment exception by drawing
analogies to different evidentiary concepts. Both sides used these analogies
to avoid confronting the incoherence of their balancing analysis. For the
majority, Justice Brennan noted that the Court had insisted in the past that
"evidence that has been illegally obtained... is inadmissible on the govern-
ment's direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt." 14 Quot-
ing language from Havens, Walder, Harris, and Hass that suggests the Court
approves illegally obtained "impeachment" evidence for "impeachment"
purposes only, Justice Brennan implicitly argued that this limitation helps
define when the exception generates net gains to truth-seeking or
deterrence. 141
In contrast, the dissenters rejected the familiar characterization of the
exception as an "impeachment" exception in favor of the claim that the
Court's "consistent rule has been that a defendant's testimony is subject to
rebuttal by contradicting evidence that otherwise would be excluded."1 42
Although Justice Kennedy did not directly address the majority's assertion
that evidence admitted pursuant to the exception could not be used as "sub-
stantive evidence of guilt," he chose to recast the exception as a rebuttal,
rather than an impeachment, exception to highlight his rejection of the de-
fendant's "impeachment-only" interpretation of that limitation. James had
argued that prohibiting substantive use of illegally obtained proof while al-
lowing its use for impeachment dictated that only a defendant's testimony
efforts to reach conclusions about the scope of the impeachment exception by analyzing the incen-
tives to gather proof created by different definitions of the exception derived from the principles of
evidence. Those efforts amount to unsuccessful attempts to demonstrate that truth-seeking and de-
terrence are not inversely proportionate because of the limited evidentiary context in which illegal
proof may be used. Whether truth-seeking and deterrence are so related is ultimately a question of
the actual behavioral effects of the rules and the exception that cannot be answered by the rationalist
analysis of incentives. On the limits of rationalist inquiry in general and incentive analysis in partic-
ular, see Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 711 (1980); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problens A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981); Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980). For a discussion of whether the empirical debate about deterrence
can rationally inform the balance between truth-seeking and deterrence that the exception claims to
create, see text accompanying notes 268-281 infra.
140. James, 493 U.S. at 313 (quoting United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980)).
141. Id. at 311-13.
142. Id. at 323 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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could be contradicted with illegally obtained evidence.143 Only when used
to impeach the defendant would the proof demonstrate "self-contradiction"
and thus impeach "by means of the contradiction itself, the substantive truth
or falsity of the suppressed evidence . . . [being] irrelevant." 144 In other
words, using illegally obtained evidence to contradict the testimony of a de-
fense witness is not true "impeachment" because it requires the factfinder to
evaluate the evidence's "substantive truth."
Although implicitly conceding that this conception of impeachment
proof would be sensible were the previous impeachment exception cases lim-
ited to evidence of a defendant's inconsistent statements, Justice Kennedy
properly noted that the cases also admitted evidence which contradicted a
defendant's testimony only if the jury believed in the substantive truth of the
fact suggested by the proof.145 In Walder and Havens, the illegally obtained
evidence consisted of unlawfully seized physical evidence used to contradict
the defendants' claims that they had not knowingly possessed the evidence.
Thus, the prohibition on using illegally obtained evidence as "substantive
proof of guilt" did not prevent the factfinder from considering those infer-
ences that did follow from a belief in the "substantive truth" of the facts
established by the proof.
Justice Kennedy then analogized the issue of the exception's proper
boundaries to the evidentiary question of the appropriate scope of rebuttal
evidence. He urged the requirement of a "direct contradiction" between the
illegally obtained proof and defense witness testimony, with perhaps a limi-
tation to impeachment of the witness's direct testimony. Justice Kennedy
compared these requirements to the familiar inquiry of defining the proper
scope of rebuttal, "a task that trial judges can be expected to perform with-
out difficulty." 146 Accordingly, the dissenters relied on the concept of rebut-
tal use of illegally obtained evidence, just as the majority relied on the notion
of impeachment use of illegally obtained evidence, to define the proper scope
of the exception. By confining use of the evidence to circumstances in which
that evidence falls within the scope of appropriate rebuttal, the dissent hoped
to reduce the incentive to obtain evidence illegally and to permit its use only
when it could generate a net gain on the truth-seeking side of the balance.
James was not the first case to note that the opposing analogies to the
concepts of impeachment or rebuttal might be useful in deciding whether to
extend the impeachment exception to defense witnesses. The question had
already emerged in the lower courts.147 But the dispute about defining the
143. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 324 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 325 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy continued by drawing an anal-
ogy between such a determination and a decision about whether a statement is inconsistent for pur-
poses of applying the rules regulating impeachment use of inconsistent statements. Id. The analogy
further demonstrates the overlap between impeachment and rebuttal proof. See note 148 infra and
accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnote
omitted):
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exception as informed by impeachment or rebuttal analogies reveals that la-
bels can be misleading. The ambiguous concept of impeachment, as applied
to proof contradicting an opposing party's evidence, can easily accommodate
all rebuttal evidence.
Impeachment is employed in several different ways. It sometimes applies
only to self-contradiction: witness statements or conduct suggesting facts
contrary to the witness's testimony. When impeachment is defined in that
fashion, the category of rebuttal proof is reserved for all evidence, apart from
a witness's own statements or conduct, that can nonetheless refute an adver-
sary's case.
However, the concept of impeachment is most often stretched to encom-
pass all contradicting proof, not just an adverse witness's inconsistent state-
ments or conduct. Because it suggests facts which contradict the opposing
party's proof, it necessarily reflects on the credibility of that proof. This
broader sense of impeachment evidence, typically characterized as impeach-
ment-by-contradiction evidence, includes all rebuttal proof that, by refuting
an adversary's evidence, suggests its lack of credibility.
The choice of a definition of impeachment depends upon the purpose
served by making the classification. No uniform definition of impeachment
or rebuttal proof applies in every context, but two contexts are particularly
important for unravelling the confusion surrounding the scope of the im-
peachment exception. The first is the hearsay context, in which impeach-
ment evidence is exempt from the hearsay bar. Here, impeachment proof is
distinguished from substantive proof by its ability to reflect on the credibility
of a witness's testimony, regardless of the "truth of the matter asserted" by
the evidence. In this context, therefore, impeachment-by-contradiction
proof would be excluded from the rubric of impeachment.
The second context is in determining the appropriate scope of rebuttal
proof. In the rebuttal proof area, the proof must refute the opposing party's
case enough to justify its admission where it would not otherwise be admissi-
ble. The truth of the matter limitation is irrelevant. Since all rebuttal evi-
dence will necessarily be impeachment proof because it bears on the
credibility of the opposing party's proof, impeachment-by-contradiction evi-
dence is admissible. Under this approach, classifying evidence as rebuttal or
impeachment proof is simply a matter of labelling, rather than substance. 148
Since it has been held permissible to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach testimony
by the defendant, the government argues that it should also be possible to use the same
testimony to rebut the expert psychiatric witnesses.... Although it is indeed true that if a
defendant takes the stand and testifies in a manner contradicted by illegally obtained evi-
dence, that evidence can be used for the limited purpose of impeachment, there is as yet no
basis in law for converting this limited exception into a general license to use illegally
obtained evidence for rebuttal purposes.
148. There is one instance in which impeachment-by-contradiction evidence may not overlap
entirely with the concept of rebuttal proof. Impeachment-by-contradiction evidence will generally
not be defined to include proof admitted to contradict misleading cross-examination or argument,
because there is no adverse witness being contradicted. Thus, such proof may mistakenly be consid-
ered rebuttal rather than impeachment-by-contradiction evidence. The categorization is insignifi-
cant to the argument, however, because such proof nonetheless may easily be thought of as
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With these analogies in mind, the conflict in James becomes clear. While
claiming to characterize the exception as an impeachment exception, the de-
fendant in James really employed the narrower hearsay-derived definition of
impeachment proof. Thus, he argued for limiting the exception to impeach-
ment by "self-contradiction."' 149 Meanwhile, claiming to restyle the excep-
tion as a rebuttal exception, the dissenters advocated the broader rebuttal-
derived definition of impeachment, as accentuated by their willingness to
concede the term, although there was no need to do so. Finally, the majority
appeared to adopt the defendant's narrow, "impeachment only" definition,
but failed to address the dissenters' criticism of James's argument.
The ultimate significance of the dispute over the proper evidentiary con-
ception of the exception was, of course, not evidentiary at all. The point was
to ascertain which evidentiary analogy would define the scope of the excep-
tion in a fashion to assure net gains to truth-seeking. The concepts of im-
peachment proof or rebuttal proof, like all legal concepts, can only be
defined contextually.150 In the end, the proof is in the pudding: We must
evaluate those concepts according to whether they can render a coherent
notion of how different definitions of the scope of the exception can generate
net gains or losses in the truth-seeking/deterrence balance, not according to
their past successes as traditional principles of evidence.
The next two subsections evaluate the evidentiary concepts of impeach-
ment and rebuttal proof, as they have been employed to discover the in-
dependent variation of truth-seeking and deterrence that is necessary to
render a coherent method of determining the scope of the exception. These
subsections will dispel the notion that the evidentiary concepts of impeach-
ment and rebuttal proof can provide a framework for identifying appropriate
boundaries of the exception. When removed from their purely evidentiary
context and transplanted into constitutional criminal procedure, the con-
cepts of impeachment and rebuttal proof cannot avoid the problem of the
inversely proportional relationship between deterrence and truth-seeking.
The indeterminacy of the analysis in James, therefore, demonstrates how
these evidentiary concepts reproduce, rather than resolve, the underlying in-
coherence of the truth-seeking/deterrence balance.
impeachment-by-contradiction evidence. Cross-examination elicits evidence, albeit from a witness
not adverse to the prosecution, that defense counsel will use in the same way as evidence elicited
from a defense witness. Moreover, the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically permit impeachment
of one's own witness. See FED. R. EVID. 607. Thus, the prosecution's contradiction of a prosecution
witness's cross-examination can easily be thought of as impeachment-by-contradiction. Argument,
while eliciting no evidence per se, helps to clarify the inferences that counsel would have the jury
draw from the proof, and the contradiction of such inferences is equivalent to the contradiction of
the proof itself. Indeed, for present purposes, the permissible inferences that may be drawn from the
proof are the evidence.
149. See James, 493 U.S. at 323 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying notes
143-144 supra.
150. See R.M. UNGER, supra note 6, at 31-33 (noting modem view of the nature of concepts,
including legal concepts); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THE-
ORY 3-94 (1973); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809 (1935); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924).
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1. Impeachment.
Defining the boundary of the exception by analogy to impeachment evi-
dence limits the factual inferences properly drawn from illegally obtained
proof. Its implicit model is the distinction between the hearsay and non-
hearsay uses of inconsistent statements by nonparty witnesses. That model
distinguishes between evidence used impermissibly to establish the "truth of
the matter asserted" and evidence used permissibly to demonstrate self-con-
tradiction. This distinction appears in James's argument, as well as in the
Court's approval of instructions in Walder, Harris, and Hass that limited the
factfnder's use of the proof to credibility purposes only. 15 1 Such instruc-
tions, also given by countless lower courts which admitted evidence pursuant
to the impeachment exception, were borrowed from the hearsay-derived jury
instruction, which warns the jury not to consider the proof for the "truth of
the matter asserted."' 152
The hearsay model, however, is inappropriate for several reasons. First,
it only applies coherently to illegally obtained proof of "statements" as de-
fined in the context of hearsay evidence. Yet the impeachment exception has
never been limited to statement evidence, and neither truth-seeking nor de-
terrence considerations demand such a limitation. Second, when faced with
statement proof at a criminal jury trial, the Court has recognized the futility
of distinguishing between impeachment and substantive uses of incriminat-
ing statements or otherwise limiting the inferential use of defendants' state-
ments. 153 Thus, any instruction requiring the limited use of statement proof
is, by the Court's own analysis, presumptively ineffective. Finally, the dis-
tinction between substantive and impeachment uses of evidence, drawn in
the context of applying the hearsay rule, is fundamentally inappropriate in
151. See James, 493 U.S. at 313 n.3 (citing limiting instructions given in Hass, Harris, and
Walder as evidence that "impeachment" had been defined to forbid using the evidence as "substan-
tive" proof of guilt).
152. See, eg., United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 912 (2d Cir.) (noting that limiting instruc-
tion informing jury to use evidence for "impeachment purposes only" should be given at defense
counsel's request), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966); Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (permitting use of defendant's statements to impeach his credibility); Mitchell v. Wyrick,
536 F. Supp. 395, 399 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (equating impeachment use of defendant's prior statement
with inconsistent statement proof), aff'd 698 F.2d 940 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1135 (1983);
Vargas v. Brown, 512 F. Supp. 271, 279-80 (D.RIA. 1981) (holding that since defendant's prior state-
ment was "to be used only for the limited purpose of impeachment," it was error for the trial court
to allow the prosecutor to ask the jury "to regard it as 'true' "); United States ex rel Dixon v. Cavell,
284 F. Supp. 535, 539-40 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (interpreting Walder as holding "that the prosecution may
make use of unlawfully obtained evidence ... in the form of testimony for the purpose of impeaching
the credibility of a defendant" and noting that "the trial judge very adequately cautioned the jury
that the prior inconsistent statement may not be considered substantive evidence but may only be
used to impeach the defendants as witnesses"); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843, 848 (W.D. Ky.
1962) (holding that illegally seized evidence showing bookmaking activity that is "inadmissible for
the purpose of showing that the plaintiffs were engaged in the business of accepting wagers" is
"admissible to impeach plaintiffs' testimony that they were not engaged in that business"); see also
James B. Haddad, Post-Bruton Developments A Reconsideration of the Confrontation Rationale, and
A Proposal for A Due Process Evaluation of Limiting Instructions, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 42 n.230
(1980) (noting that courts consistently give limiting instruction appropriate for out-of-court state-
ments of nonparty witness when unlawfully obtained evidence is admitted).
153. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129-35 (1968).
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the constitutional context. That distinction is designed to ensure the reliabil-
ity of proof, a concern that is not present for evidence admitted pursuant to
the impeachment exception. According to the Court, evidence admitted
pursuant to the exception is problematic only because it was illegally ob-
tained. Otherwise, the evidence's admissibility in furtherance of truth-seek-
ing would be a foregone conclusion.15 4 Thus, the distinction that the
hearsay-derived definition of impeachment draws between permissible and
impermissible uses of illegally obtained proof fails to identify net gains to
truth-seeking or deterrence.
Because the hearsay-derived definition of impeachment proof applies
only to "statement" evidence, the immediate problem with borrowing that
definition to set the scope of the impeachment exception is accommodating
Walder and Havens, the cases in which physical evidence impeached the de-
fendant's testimony. James attempted to solve this problem by defining "im-
peachment" as proof of self-contradiction. He argued that such proof
included physical evidence that contradicted a testifying defendant, because
the proof could be conceived as impeaching the defendant's testimony, irre-
spective of the truth of the matter asserted by the evidence. James's position
found implicit support in the Court's unexplained statement in Havens that
"evidence that has been illegally obtained... is inadmissible on the govern-
ment's direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt ' 155 and ex-
plicit support in Justice Brennan's Havens dissent. In Havens, Justice
Brennan elided evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent conduct and state-
ments and suggested that both types of proof were potentially subject to
limited inferential use on the hearsay model. According to Justice Brennan,
a defendant/witness's inconsistent conduct and statements logically impeach
his testimony by establishing merely that the defendant/witness has contra-
dicted himself, regardless of which proof is true.156
Nonetheless, only statement evidence impeaches irrespective of the
"truth of the matter asserted." For this purpose, "statement" may be de-
fined narrowly, as it is in the Federal Rules of Evidence, to exclude verbal
and nonverbal conduct not intended as an assertion and to exclude assertive
verbal conduct when offered for other than its asserted inference.157 It also
may be defined more broadly, as at common law, to include all assertive
conduct whether the assertion be intended or implied from the declarant's
belief as to the matter asserted. 158 Neither definition of "statement" evi-
154. Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978) (prohibiting, on due process grounds,
the use of involuntary statements to impeach a defendant because of the unreliability of such state-
ments). The impeachment exception applies to evidence only if "the trustworthiness of the evidence
satisfies legal standards." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
155. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980).
156. Id. at 632 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) & advisory committee's note.
158. For modem examples of the broader definitions, see Michael H. Graham, "Stickperson
Hearsay'" A Simplified Approach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv.
887, 900-02 (1982); Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 61 TEx. L. REv. 49, 92 n.191 (1982).
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dence is broad enough to include all nonassertive conduct that contradicts
the defendant/witness's testimony. Such evidence can never be analogous to
hearsay proof.
Havens is a perfect example. The incriminating T-shirts in Havens's lug-
gage had no assertive aspect to prompt an analogy to hearsay proof.
Whether the evidence served to impeach depended upon the truth of the
facts proved. In order to be considered inconsistent with Havens's testi-
mony, the T-shirts had to be substantive proof that he had assisted his co-
venturer with the smuggling, despite his denials. Inconsistent statements
prove that the witness has made at least one false statement; but inconsistent
physical evidence only proves that the witness stated falsely if the jury
chooses to believe the physical evidence over the witness's testimony. A wit-
ness's prior inconsistent conduct properly qualifies as "impeachment by self-
contradiction" only when its assertive quality implicates the witness's testi-
monial capacities. 159 Much highly probative evidence of a defendant-wit-
ness's conduct will contradict his testimony without falling under any
definition of a hearsay statement.160
The concept of "impeachment by self-contradiction," applied to non-
statement evidence, limits the inferences that may properly be drawn from
that evidence no more than any other contradicting proof. For purposes of
analytic clarity, this article rejects the ambiguous designation of "self-con-
tradiction" and distinguishes between "impeachment by inconsistent state-
ment proof" and "impeachment-by-contradiction evidence." The former
includes all evidence of a witness's conduct, verbal or nonverbal, the "asser-
159. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 34, 47 (3d ed. 1984).
160. See id. § 34, at 73-74; see also Jacks v. Duckworth, 486 F. Supp. 1366, 1369-70 (N.D. Ind.
1980) (noting that it is proper to use statements obtained through illegal wiretaps to impeach testi-
mony of defendant and defense witness about existence of various telephone calls), aff'd, 651 F.2d
480 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982); United States v. Carrasquillo, 412 F. Supp.
289, 291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding evidence that defendant possessed marked bills which had been
used in heroin transaction admissible to impeach the credibility of his assertion that the money came
from elsewhere). Nor will such proof necessarily be limited to physical evidence. In Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 716-17 (1975), for example, the defendant's testimony that he did not know the houses
from which two bicycles had been stolen was impeached by evidence that he had correctly pointed
out the houses to the police after his arrest. Substantial authority supports the proposition that the
act of pointing out the correct houses is "conduct" proof establishing circumstantial evidence of
knowledge, rather than mere "statement" proof subject to a limiting instruction requiring the
factfinder to ignore the "truth of the matter asserted" by the statement; under that view, the signifi-
cance of the evidence as conduct revealing and not asserting the knowledge in the hearsay sense is so
overwhelming as to exempt it from the hearsay bar. See, eg., Bridges v. State, 247 Wis. 350, 19
N.W.2d 529 (1945); RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMs, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 362 (2d ed. 1982). Thus conceived, the
proof would impeach by contradiction and not by inconsistent statement. The relative power of the
proof as circumstantial evidence of knowledge is revealed by the Hass Court's approval of the intro-
duction of evidence that the defendant had correctly pointed out the houses, rather than limiting the
prosecution to the use of an earlier statement made by the defendant to the police. See Hass, 420
U.S. at 717. In the earlier statement, Hass simply asserted that he knew which houses the bicycles
had been stolen from. Thus, the Court went out of its way to permit the introduction of the im-
peachment-by-contradiction proof, for which an instruction prohibiting its use to prove "the truth of
the matter asserted" would be insufficient. Id. at 717-18. Such proof was also the most damaging
precisely because its probative value did not depend, in any significant sense, on its assertive quality.
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tive" aspect of which may define it as a "statement" in the hearsay context.
The latter includes all evidence of a witness's conduct the probative value of
which is independent of its assertive aspect.
In the cases in which the Court permitted an illegally obtained inconsis-
tent statement to impeach a defendant, it suggested that such evidence was
properly admitted only for its limited "nonhearsay" purpose. But James
made clear that this limited admissibility could not define the scope of the
exception because the Court also permitted a defendant's impeachment with
impeachment-by-contradiction evidence.161 Consequently, the fact that
James admitted his hair was red at the time of the crime could not impeach
his witness's contrary testimony unless the jury credited the truth of the
matter asserted by the admission, but it could still properly be used to con-
tradict his witness's testimony. The evidentiary analogy to impeachment
proof does not consider the admission differently from the other impeach-
ment-by-contradiction evidence that the Court has routinely admitted to
contradict defendant testimony.
The recognition that the impeachment exception encompasses impeach-
ment-by-contradiction evidence raises the question of what the Court in-
tends by prohibiting its use as "substantive evidence of guilt." Further, one
must ask if there is an intelligible way of conveying what the Court means by
the nonsubstantive, or "credibility-only," use of impeachment-by-contradic-
tion evidence. A limiting instruction derived from hearsay principles is
clearly inapplicable because the impeachment value of the proof is unrelated
to its assertive aspect. A general instruction to consider the evidence only
for its credibility inferences would also be ineffective, because the credibility
use of impeachment-by-contradiction evidence, unlike inconsistent state-
ment proof, presupposes that the jury will believe it to be credible "substan-
tive proof of guilt." Thus, it is impossible for a jury to separate out the
permissible from the impermissible inferences that may be drawn from the
proof. 162
When the rules of evidence rely on a limiting instruction to distinguish
between inferences that may or may not be drawn from proof, the
factfinder's use of the evidence for permitted (here credibility) purposes does
not presuppose its use for prohibited (here substantive) purposes. For exam-
ple, when courts admit evidence of prior felony convictions or acts of un-
truthfulness on the issue of the defendant's credibility, but not to establish a
criminal propensity, the probative value of the evidence as proof of credibil-
ity does not presuppose the jury's finding it valuable proof of the existence of
the propensity.1 63 The examples may be multiplied, 164 but the point remains
161. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1990).
162. It is therefore not surprising that the courts which perceive the scope of the exception as
defined by the concept of impeachment would use the "truth of the matter" instruction, although
occasionally sensing that it was obviously inapplicable to nonstatement proof. See Haddad, supra
note 152, at 42.
163. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 608, 609.
164. See FED. R. EVID. 407, 408.
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the same: The jury cannot draw separate inferences of credibility and sub-
stance from impeachment-by-contradiction proof because the distinction it-
self is confused in that context. For example, the T-shirts in Havens
reflected on the credibility of Havens's denial if and only if the jury under-
stood that the presence of the T-shirts was incriminating-that is, substan-
tive evidence of guilt-and therefore contradictory of his exculpatory
testimony. One need not even discuss the practical reality that juries are
notoriously unable to follow even coherent instructions.1 65
Past history also demonstrates that instruction would not ensure that the
jury could distinguish between the inferences to be drawn even from illegal
proof of inconsistent statements. In Jackson v. Denno,1 66 the Court invali-
dated a New York procedure which relied heavily on an instruction that the
jury should disregard a defendant's admission.1 67 It reached that conclusion
despite the fact that the jury also would have heard evidence that the state-
ment was involuntary and had been suppressed by the court.1 68 Similarly,
the Court in Bruton v. United States169 held presumptively ineffective an
instruction telling a jury to disregard out-of-court statements made by a non-
testifying co-defendant. 170 It is even less plausible to assume that a jury will
disregard reliable, inculpatory statements made by the defendant himself1 7 1
Even when impeaching statements are not obviously inculpatory, at-
tempts to limit the jury's inferences are equally doomed to fail. All false
exculpatory statements imply a guilty conscience. The hearsay analogy does
not help distinguish a false exculpatory statement's credibility use from its
substantive use, since false exculpatory statements are not offered for the
"truth of the matter asserted." Prior to Harris, which extended the im-
peaChment exception to "noncollateral" statements obtained in violation of
165. Justice Brennan's criticism of the effectiveness of the limiting instruction offered in the
impeachment exception cases was understated. He erroneously presupposed a coherent way of dis-
tinguishing the substantive and credibility inferences of impeachment-by-contradiction evidence, ar-
guing only that "it is unrealistic to assume that limiting instructions will afford the defendant
significant protection." United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 632 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
166. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
167. See id. at 377-91; cf Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896) (stating that a
confession is "the strongest evidence against the party making it that can be given of the facts stated
in such confession").
168. See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 377-78.
169. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
170. Id. at 137.
171. See Haddad, supra note 152, at 42. Indeed, Justice White dissented in Bruton precisely
because of the relative likelihood that the jury would disregard the inculpatory statements of a co-
defendant, compared with the certainty that they would not disregard inculpatory statements of the
defendant himself. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 139-40 (White, J., dissenting). The Court more recently
has expressed some doubt about the wisdom of Bruton. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 191
(1987). However, it has not questioned the holding of Jackson v. Denno, which has since been incor-
porated into the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EviD. 104(c) & advisory committee's note.
Also, it is noteworthy that the Court transmitted the Federal Rules of Evidence to Congress in a
form that would have permitted substantive use of all prior statements of testifying witnesses subject
to cross-examination concerning the statements, in part because of the belief that, notwithstanding
any limiting instruction, such statements would inevitably be considered substantive proof. See FED.
R. EVID. at 801(d)(1)(A) & advisory committee's note; Haddad, supra note 152, at 38.
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Miranda, some cases permitted the use of false exculpatory statements, but
not admissions, on the theory that "the truth of the impeaching statement
does not itself tend to establish guilt."' 172 But this circumstance has nothing
to do with limiting the use of the statement to its "credibility" inferences,
because a false exculpatory statement provides powerful substantive evi-
dence of guilt.173 The only distinction between the inculpatory admission
and the false exculpatory statement is that the former provides direct, and
the latter circumstantial, evidence of guilt. Neither is necessarily more pro-
bative than the other. 174
The futile attempts of the lower courts in James to apply Havens, which
required that impeachment-by-contradiction evidence be treated as "im-
peachment" proof and not as "substantive" evidence of guilt, also illustrate
the confusion resulting from the hearsay analogy. The trial court admitted
the illegally obtained statements, instructing the jury that the evidence was
offered "to refute and rebut," as well as to "impeach" the defense witness.175
In concluding that the proof should have been excluded, the Illinois Court of
Appeals criticized the trial judge for admitting the evidence, but also noted
that the court had "failed to instruct the jury properly on the use to be made
of this evidence." 176 Instead of giving such a limiting instruction, the appel-
late court noted, the trial court had allowed the State in effect to make sub-
stantive use of the defendant's suppressed statements.1 77 Notwithstanding
all this criticism, the appellate court never explained how the defendant's
statement that his hair was red could impeach the credibility of the defense
witness who said that it was black, unless the jury considered the statement a
172. Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also Johnson v. United
States, 344 F.2d 163, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1964); cf Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915, 920-21 (D.C.
Cir. 1959) (Burger, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between admission of the crime itself and other
"true" impeachment).
173. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) ("In fact, statements merely intended
to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used... to demonstrate untruths in the statement given
under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication."); United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97,
102-03 (2d Cir. 1968) (that false exculpatory statements are powerful evidence of guilty knowledge
demonstrates unworkable character of Walder's requirement that impeachment proof be related to
collateral matters); United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470, 475-76 (3d Cir. 1968) (holding
that a test distinguishing between collateral and noncollateral statements based on whether state-
ments are exculpatory on their face was "too artificial to be acceptable").
174. See 1 L. SAND ET AL., supra note 84, 5.01, at 5-6; see also Michalic v. Cleveland Tank-
ers, 364 U.S. 325, 330 (1960) (stating that circumstantial proof may be "more certain, satisfying and
persuasive than direct evidence"); United States v. Holland, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954) (holding
that circumstantial proof is no different from direct evidence in that the jury must "weigh the
chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous
inference"); United States v. Young, 568 F.2d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 1978) ("circumstantial evidence...
is intrinsically as probative as direct evidence"); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 60 (1988) (noting
that "circumstantial evidence is not necessarily inferior" and thus the Federal Rules of Evidence
"draw no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence").
175. See People v. James, 153 I1l App. 3d 131, 505 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987),
rev'd, 123 Ill. 2d 523, 528 N.E.2d 723 (1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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probative admission "rebutting and refuting" the defense witness's
testimony.
In concluding that the proof had properly been admitted, the Illinois
Supreme Court probed further into the question of the appropriate use of the
evidence, but ultimately found that any possible error in the jury instructions
or argument of counsel was harmless. 178 It properly recognized that the
trial court's pattern instruction on impeachment evidence "does not fit the
situation in this case, because the instruction refers to a prior statement by a
witness which contradicts the evidence given by that witness at trial." 179 It
assumed that the trial court should have granted the instruction requested
by the defense, which told the jury that the defendant's statement could be
used by the jury "only as it may affect the believability of [the defense wit-
ness]" and not "as evidence of the commission of any of the crimes
charged."'1 80 The Illinois Supreme Court also concluded that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury to consider the statement as proof that the de-
fendant's hair "was not black but ... red at the point the officer said the
defendant told him it was red." 181 Still, the Illinois Supreme Court did not
explain how the jury could possibly evaluate how the defendant's statement
affected the believability of the defense witness's claim that the defendant's
hair was black, without considering it as proof that the defendant's hair was
red. Indeed, the court itself could not distinguish between use of the state-
ment as credibility proof or as evidence of the crimes charged. After criticiz-
ing the trial court for telling the jury that it could consider the defendant's
statement as proof that his hair was red, it inconsistently noted that the
prosecutor properly argued that the statement was an admission by James of
his hair color because the comment helped the jury to decide whether the
defense witness would lie for the defendant!18 2
Because hearsay analogies cannot be applied to nonstatement evidence,
and because they require limitations on inferential use that are impossible to
achieve in this area of law, they cannot provide an answer to the truth-seek-
ing/deterrence riddle. No one should be surprised by this result because
hearsay law was never meant to address that question: It has no impact on
deterrence or truth-seeking.
By circumscribing the inferential use of impeachment-by-contradiction
proof, the Court has not meaningfully reduced the prosecution's incentive to
178. People v. James, 123 Ill. 2d 523, 528 N.E.2d 723 (1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
179. Id. at 730-31.
180. See id at 730.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 731. The dissenting Justices were equally confused. Justice Ward asserted that the
hearsay-derived definition of impeachment must apply to illegally obtained proof. Id. at 731 (Ward,
J., dissenting). Justice Ward was simply assuming his own conclusion that the exception should not
be extended to include impeachment of the testimony of defense witnesses.
Justice Clark correctly noted that "the prosecution, the defense counsel, and the court all stum-
bled ... badly over the question of instructing the jury." Id. at 734 (Clark, J., dissenting). Yet he
too "stumbled" into relying on the hearsay analogy when he suggested that "the use of the defend-
ant's statement to rebut ... [the defense witness's] testimony is not impeachment as traditionally
understood." Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
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obtain such proof. The prosecution knows those limits cannot be main-
tained in theory or practice, so impeachment-by-contradiction proof is just
as tempting as it would be absent limiting instructions. In addition, since the
prosecution will not know until trial whether its evidence will be used to
impeach by contradiction or by inconsistent statement, the distinction does
not affect its incentive to obtain the proof. The use of James's suppressed
statement, for example, was impeachment-by-contradiction evidence because
it contradicted the testimony of a defense witness. Had James himself testi-
fied to the same facts, the Court might have conceived the very same state-
ment as inconsistent statement impeachment and admitted it subject to the
hearsay-derived limiting instruction. But in that event, the Court's own
analysis suggests that a jury inevitably would use inconsistent statement im-
peachment as substantive evidence of guilt. Thus, the prospect of limiting
instruction will have no effect on the prosecution's incentive to obtain incon-
sistent statement evidence, either.
Reliance on the hearsay analogy to define the boundaries of the exception
is as fundamentally misconceived from the perspective of truth-seeking as it
is from that of deterrence. The hearsay rule does not exclude statements of a
party opponent because those statements supposedly contribute to the adver-
sarial truth-seeking process. 183 Ordinary conceptions of truth-seeking per-
mit the use of the proof "for its truth," and since the Court has limited the
exception to illegally obtained evidence the reliability of which is not sus-
pect,18 4 there is no reason to pretend that the proof is unreliable hearsay.
By the same token, the proof need not be hearsay in order to further
deterrence relative to truth-seeking. Despite the Court's suggestion other-
wise, impeachment-by-contradiction and inconsistent statement evidence
cannot be limited, since analysis establishes that the use of both forms of
proof as substantive evidence of guilt is equally inevitable. Therefore, the
meaningful alternatives are either completely excluding the proof in the in-
terest of deterrence or accepting substantive use of the evidence in the inter-
est of truth-seeking. The hearsay analogy cannot provide a framework for
identifying when the exception can be expected to effect net gains to truth-
seeking or deterrence.
In sum, the analogy between the scope of the impeachment exception
and the limited inferential use of inconsistent statement impeachment evi-
dence is fundamentally confused. The analogy misapplies the hearsay-de-
rived concept of impeachment evidence, designed to address the reliability of
a particular type of proof, in a context in which it has no coherent applica-
tion. Consequently, rather than suggesting boundaries to the exception ra-
tionally related to the goals of truth-seeking or deterrence, the analogy to
impeachment evidence suggests arbitrary limitations on the scope of the ex-
ception. As a result, the Court's decision in James could not derive rational
boundaries, and was reduced to reaffirming the empty limitation on infer-
183. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
184. See note 154 supra.
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ences that properly could be drawn from illegally obtained evidence. It
could not explain how that limitation would assure that the exception's
truth-seeking benefits would outweigh its deterrence costs.
2. Rebuttal
As an alternative to the hearsay approach, the analogy to rebuttal evi-
dence recognizes that proof will be used to infer guilt and to assess credibil-
ity. This approach, therefore, does not attempt to limit the factual
inferences that may be drawn from illegally obtained proof. Instead, it
equates the impeachment exception with the admission of rebuttal evidence,
implicitly assuming that illegally obtained evidence may qualify as appropri-
ate rebuttal when evaluated in the context of the defenses raised at trial.
This assumption influenced Justice Kennedy's suggestion in James that im-
peachment of defense witnesses be limited to testimony "directly contra-
dicted" by illegal proof, and also influenced the related discussions in James
and Havens about limiting the exception to impeach only direct
testimony. 185
Although avoiding the patent errors of the impeachment approach, the
rebuttal approach is also fatally flawed. In the end, it reproduces, rather
than resolves, the problem of deciding when the exception will effect net
gains to truth-seeking or deterrence. That result occurs because the concept
of rebuttal proof is also inappropriately applied outside its evidentiary con-
text. The Court's attempts to remedy that flaw succeed only in imposing
equally indefensible limitations on the exception.
Traditionally, the issue of what constitutes appropriate rebuttal proof
arises when the contribution of evidence to the truth-seeking process at a
criminal trial is itself problematic. The proof must have a potentially preju-
dicial effect on the jury.186 Determinations about whether the defense has
opened the door to otherwise inadmissible rebuttal evidence concern the
shifting balance of probative value and prejudicial effect on the truth-seeking
process itself.
Illegally obtained evidence, however, poses no such problem for truth-
185. This approach has also prompted countless discussions in lower court cases about similar
restrictions intended to define what was required to "open the door" to illegally obtained evidence.
See, eg., United States v. Mariani, 539 F.2d 915, 922-24 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that contradiction
with direct examination required); United States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 144 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974)
(although illegal statements and tangible evidence may differ "in their relative values for impeach-
ment and evidentiary functions," courts should limit use of both kinds of illegal evidence by requir-
ing that it directly contradict testimony given on direct examination); United States v. Tweed, 503
F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (7th Cir. 1974) (direct contradiction required); United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d
506 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); United States ex rel Wright v. LaVallee, 471 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1972)
(same), cert denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Volpicelli v. Salamack, 447 F. Supp. 652, 660-61
(S.D.N.Y.) (notwithstanding Harris; illegally obtained inconsistent statements of a defendant are
admissible "only where the defendant's testimony on direct examination specifically initiates the
issue to which the inconsistent statements are directed," while a "general denial of the commission of
the offense is not sufficient to 'open the door' to use the impeaching testimony"), aff'd without op.,
578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir. 1978); People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350, 501 P.2d 918
(1972) (contradiction with direct examination required), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 863 (1973).
186. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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seeking. The Court has limited the impeachment exception's reach to evi-
dence that, but for its illegal origins, would be admissible in furtherance of
the truth-seeking process under ordinary evidentiary principles. 187 If the ev-
idence were not otherwise admissible, there would be no need to consider at
all the effect on the truth-seeking process of its exclusion by rules of constitu-
tional criminal procedure. Because the proof's only "prejudicial" effect is its
cost to deterrence, the rebuttal analogy simply restates the question of the
effect of admission of the evidence on truth-seeking and deterrence.
The impropriety of the analogy between the impeachment exception and
evidentiary rebuttal can be illustrated by comparing the considerations that
govern both determinations. Consider first the question whether the prose-
cution may use similar act evidence.188 Such proof has both permissible and
impermissible uses that define its probative value and its prejudicial effect.
To be admissible as rebuttal proof, its probative value must not be substan-
tially exceeded by the likelihood that it will be used for impermissible pur-
poses, thus prejudicing the factfinding determination. However, the
defendant can still control whether the proof is ultimately admitted by
choosing not to contest the issues on which the similar act proof is
admissible.
However, when applied to the case of illegally obtained evidence, weigh-
ing the evidence's probative value against its "prejudicial" effect requires a
prior resolution of the truth-seeking/deterrence dilemma. Consequently, the
analogy simply restates the question without shedding light on the answer.
Furthermore, the caveat that the defendant may avoid the proof by not con-
testing the issues on which it is admissible is also inappropriate. When the
defendant chooses not to contest the issues on which similar act evidence is
permissible proof, the prosecution benefits from the proof and the defendant
avoids its prejudicial effect, because its probative value and its prejudicial
effect are separable. There is no similar resolution possible in the case of
illegally obtained proof, because its probative value and its prejudicial effect
are realized regardless of whether the proof is ultimately admitted or serves
only to deter the presentation of a defense. 189 By not contesting the issues
on which illegally obtained proof may be introduced, the defendant assures
the prosecution the benefit of its illegally obtained proof and thereby assures
that future victims of unlawful investigation will suffer the costs to deter-
rence imposed by the evidence's use at trial.
The analogy to evidentiary rebuttal is not merely a harmless exercise in
futility; it also undermines the Court's starting point, the exclusion of illegal
evidence from the prosecution's "case-in-chief.' 190 A rebuttal case should
187. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
188. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
189. Indeed, in the absence of a theory of how truth-seeking varies independently from deter-
rence, its probative value (for truth-seeking) is its prejudicial effect (on deterrence).
190. I am assuming for the moment that the Court means something more than excluding the
evidence from judicial review of the sufficiency of the prosecution's case when it asserts that exclu-
sion of the evidence on the prosecution's case-in-chief provides sufficient deterrence. The assump-
tion is justified by the Court's repeated attempts to limit the factfinder's ultimate use of illegally
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not be confused with rebuttal proof. The admission of evidentiary rebuttal
proof is justified by issues contested at trial-whether they are contested by
defense evidence, by cross-examination, or by relying only on the absence of
the prosecution's proof. The courts routinely and properly recognize that
defenses can be established-and thus be subject to rebuttal-without the
defendant's introducing any evidence. 191 Thus, the courts that have em-
ployed a rebuttal standard have held that a defendant may open the door to
illegally obtained proof through cross-examination or by making an argu-
ment that is considered "misleading" unless the suppressed proof is
admitted. 192
By accepting those arguments, the cases have indicated that a true evi-
dentiary rebuttal test will inevitably admit all illegally obtained evidence rel-
evant to contested issues, regardless of how those issues are contested, and
will only ban such evidence when it has already served its purpose-by deter-
ring the presentation of a defense. Counsel in James, for example, could
easily have raised the "misidentification-by-hair-color" defense by cross-ex-
amining the prosecution's witnesses, 193 by express argument,194 or by im-
plicitly relying on the prosecution's failure to meet its burden of proof.195 In
fact, because the jury may properly use the absence of proof to draw infer-
ences as to the nonexistence of facts, evidentiary rebuttal could easily allow
relevant, excluded proof to rebut those inferences. 196 Once we take this step,
there will be nothing left to stop the prosecution from using illegal evidence
even in its case-in-chief.197
In an attempt to avoid this result, the Court has injected arbitrary rules,
obtained proof. See text accompanying notes 229-267 infra for a discussion of the Court's attempts
to prevent the affirmative use of illegally obtained evidence.
191. Rebuttal proof is routinely admitted during the prosecution's case-in-chief when the door
is opened by cross-examination or argument. See eg., United States v. Carter, 801 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1012 (1986). Moreover, such proof is also routinely admitted on cross-
examination of a defense witness when: (1) his direct testimony opens the door to it; (2) the witness
is an appropriate one to introduce the proof, and (3) the witness ultimately cooperates. For example,
in James it was a pure fortuity that the prosecution was required to offer its proof on its rebuttal
case. Had the suppressed contradicting evidence consisted of an authenticated photograph of the
defendant showing his hair color at or about the time of the crime, then the proof may well have
been admitted on cross-examination. Similarly, had Walder, Havens, Harris, Hass, or even James's
witness acknowledged the facts indicated by the suppressed proof on cross-examination, there would
have been no occasion for a rebuttal case on this point at all.
192. See, eg., United States ex reL Castillo v. Fay, 350 F.2d 400, 402 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1019 (1966); People v. Payne, 98 II. 2d 45, 456 N.E.2d 44, 46 (1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1036 (1984); Commonwealth v. Wright, 234 Pa. Super. 83, 87, 339 A.2d 103, 106 (1975).
193. Defense counsel might have done so by establishing that the eyewitnesses recognized
James as the shooter only from his red hair.
194. Defense counsel might have done so by arguing that the prosecution had not established
the validity of the identifications beyond a reasonable doubt because it failed to produce a non-
accusing witness to describe James's hair color at the time of the crime.
195. Defense counsel might have done so by arguing that the prosecution had failed to produce
a noninterested identification witness.
196. Cf Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences
Associated With the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. Rav. 1011, 1014-18 (1978) (noting importance
of inferences from absence of proof in relevancy determinations).
197. Indeed, all the prosecution's proof is rebuttal evidence in the sense that it is used to rebut
the presumption of innocence.
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with no basis in either the rebuttal analogy or truth-seeking/deterrence anal-
ysis, to serve as boundaries for the impeachment exception. Consider, for
example, the direct contradiction requirement suggested by Justice
Kennedy. The lower courts in James had disputed the admissibility of the
defendant's statement that he had gone to the beauty shop to "change his
appearance" shortly after the crime. 198 Justice Kennedy seemed to agree
that the statement had been improperly admitted, presumably because it
only indirectly contradicted or rebutted the defense witness testimony. 199
Excluding this proof of consciousness of guilt as only "indirectly" con-
tradicting proof cannot be justified by the traditional analysis used in rebut-
tal cases. The validity of the eyewitnesses' identifications was certainly
contested, and the defendant's concession that he had altered his appearance
after the crime was probative on that issue. The proof had no prejudicial
elements either, so it would have clearly met the rebuttal standard.
The most likely explanation for the direct contradiction requirement is
that Justice Kennedy thought the proof should have been excluded because
it was not as probative as the defendant's admission that his appearance
matched the description given by the prosecution's eyewitnesses. 200 If so,
the direct contradiction analysis amounts to a judgment about how much
probative value the proof has in the context of the defense raised, not to a
judgment about whether the proof has some value and is thus appropriate
evidentiary rebuttal. Where the evidence does not prejudice the truth-seek-
ing process, any probative value is sufficient to ensure its admission.201
Justice Kennedy's analogy between the direct contradiction requirement
and determinations about the appropriate scope of evidentiary rebuttal that
courts routinely make "without difficulty" 20 2 was, therefore, fundamentally
misconceived. 20 3 However, his direct contradiction test is by no means the
198. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 330 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. In light of his conclusion that the introduction of James's admission of his hair color had
been proper, Justice Kennedy would have found the admission of James's consciousness of guilt, as
evidenced by his decision to change his hair color, to be harmless error. Id.
200. If this were Justice Kennedy's intent, it would be inconsistent with any possible purpose
for his proposed rebuttal test, a fact which further demonstrates how the test fails when applied
outside the evidentiary context. Some courts applying FED. R. EVID. 404(b) have evaluated the
prosecution's "need" for similar act evidence in light of its other proof on the issue to which it is
relevant. See, e.g., United States v. McMahon, 592 F.2d 871, 873-74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 921 (1979); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing FED. R. EVID.
404(b) advisory committee's note), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). That approach, in the present
context, would expressly reward the prosecution for having obtained illegal proof precisely in those
circumstances where exclusion has its maximum deterrent effect.
This explanation is consistent with Justice Kennedy's finding the "indirectly contradicting"
proof's admission to be harmless error. See note 199 supra and accompanying text. Justice
Kennedy's conclusion again relies on the discredited notion that it makes sense to generalize about
the probative value of direct and circumstantial proof.
201. This recognition seems to be the foundation of Justice Brennan's complaint in Havens
that the Court's test for the scope of contradiction of a defendant's testimony amounted to "nothing
more than a constitutional reflection of the common-law evidentiary rule of relevance." United
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 631 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. James, 493 U.S. at 325 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. To salvage the analogy to evidentiary rebuttal, one might suggest that Justice Kennedy, in
arguing that the prosecution's evidence was "unnecessary" to rebut the defense evidence of misiden-
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Court's only failure. The same problems undermine every proposed test
used in connection with the rebuttal analogy. Consider, for example, the
Court's proposal to limit rebuttal to defense testimony elicited on direct ex-
amination or to testimony purposely elicited by the defense on cross-exami-
nation.2° 4 Like the direct contradiction requirement, these restrictions
usually serve only as surrogates for measurements of the probative value of
the rebuttal proof in the context of the case. Most defendants rely on direct
or purposeful cross-examination, bringing them squarely within the Court's
impeachment formula. For the rare defendant who relies on unplanned evi-
dence as central to his defense, the Court's restrictions are merely an arbi-
trary add-on to the rebuttal analogy, because nothing in the concept of
evidentiary rebuttal prevents the refutation of unplanned, but important, evi-
dence. Rebuttal proof is admissible whenever the defendant contests an
issue, whether he planned to do so or not. The defendant's lack of responsi-
bility for initially raising the issue is irrelevant to the appropriateness of non-
prejudicial rebuttal. The costs to truth-seeking of prohibiting its rebuttal are
no less than if the defendant deliberately elicits the proof on direct
examination.
Thus, the direct contradiction, direct examination, and purposely elicited
requirements are not truly derived from the concept of evidentiary rebuttal;
rather, they protect the defendant's control over the admission of suppressed
proof, and thereby protect a value that is independent of the rebuttal analogy
and the truth-seeking/deterrence balance.
That the tests obtain no guidance from the model provided by eviden-
tiary rebuttal and instead implicitly respond to concerns outside the truth-
tification, meant that its probative value as rebuttal evidence on this issue outweighed its prejudicial
spillover effect on issues that the defendant had not contested. But the notion of prejudicial spillover
is inappropriate to otherwise permissible proof in the context of a criminal trial. The prosecution's
burden is to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, which means that every
issue not conceded by the defendant is in fact contested.
Although the courts have differed on what is required to create an issue substantial enough to
justify the admission of similar act proof in rebuttal, that dispute has reflected different sensitivities
to the prejudicial effect of the proof, rather than a belief that every issue not conceded by a defendant
is contested in a criminal trial. See, eg., United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 936-37 (2d Cir.
1980) (stating that trial judge should await conclusion of prosecution's case to determine "whether
the issue sought to be proved by the evidence is really in dispute and, if so, to assess the probative
worth of the evidence on this issue against its prejudicial effect"); compare United States v.
Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1984) (because of its prejudicial effect, similar act proof
should be excluded when concerning "only a formal issue") with United States v. Wagoner, 713 F.2d
1371, 1375-76 (8th Cir. 1983) (similar act evidence should be allowed on any issue raised by plea of
not guilty). Where there is doubt, the defendant may simply avoid the proof by stipulating to the
relevant issue. See Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 941-42. More generally, the threshold question of whether
"the issue sought to be proved is really in dispute" is itself a question of degree contingent upon the
probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence. Cf Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of Conditional
Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REV. 435 (1980) (distinction between logical and conditional relevancy is
erroneous; all determinations of relevance are questions of degree requiring contextual estimations of
probative value). Thus, the notion of a prejudicial spillover effect on uncontested issues is illogical
where the proof has no prejudicial effect on truth-seeking.
204. See Comment, supra note 135, at 166-68. The Illinois Supreme Court similarly required
that the impeached testimony be "purposely presented." People v. James, 528 N.E.2d 723, 729 (Ill.
1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
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seeking/deterrence balance is also manifest in the cases that have permitted
rebuttal of misleading cross-examination or argument. Unable to rationalize
the admission of illegally obtained proof as the consequence of the defend-
ant's introduction of his own evidence, the courts have rationalized it as a
consequence of the defendant's having unfairly taken advantage of the fact
of suppression. 20 5 But the rebuttal concept does not require unfairness in
defense counsel's actions as a precondition for opening the door to rebuttal
evidence.
In addition, the truth-seeking/deterrence balance cannot possibly justify
the "unfair advantage" test. Nothing in the balance suggests that it is unfair
for the defendant to leave the prosecution to suffer the adverse inferences
that arise from the absence of the excluded proof. Indeed, only when the
prosecution suffers those inferences can the exception ever operate as a de-
terrent at all.
Thus, the Court's attempts to inject fairness considerations into its im-
peachment analysis have no basis in the rebuttal analogy or the truth-seek-
ing/deterrence balancing test. They also have no basis in reality. The cases
permitting rebuttal of defense counsel's cross-examination and argument
make clear that, in order to define the boundaries of the impeachment excep-
tion, the Court must choose between allowing the defendant to benefit from
the absence of excluded proof, in the interest of deterrence, or allowing the
prosecution to use the evidence, in the interest of truth-seeking. The infer-
ences must be allocated to one side or another; there is no undistributed
middle.
The question of what is proper evidentiary rebuttal does not aid the
Court in making this choice. For example, in his James dissent, Justice
Kennedy tried to clarify the difference between directly and indirectly con-
tradicting proof by distinguishing between a jury's being "kept in the dark"
and being "positively misled" by the absence of suppressed proof.20 6 That
distinction implies that the Court can play a neutral role by keeping the jury
"in the dark," thus not allowing either the prosecution or the defense to
benefit from the presence or absence of illegal proof. But no neutral role is
possible; a criminal trial requires inferences to be drawn equally from the
presence and absence of the prosecution's evidence.20 7 Justice Kennedy is
simply postponing the inevitable choice of which side the Court will choose.
What inferences from the absence of the T-shirts suppressed in Havens
would Justice Kennedy have the jury draw without permitting it to be af-
firmatively misled? Would Justice Kennedy approve of the jury acquitting
205. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.6(b) (2d ed. 1987).
206. James, 493 U.S. at 324 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
207. Standard jury charges instruct the jury to evaluate both the evidence and lack of evidence
either expressly, or implicitly, through burden of proof and reasonable doubt instructions emphasiz-
ing the "clean slate" on which the Government begins its case. See I L. SAND ET AL., supra note 84,
4.01, at 4-2, 4-3 (jury instruction on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof and cited
cases). Judge Sand indicates that the better practice is a specific charge to the jury to "consider all of
the evidence or lack of evidence in reaching" its verdict. Id. 5.01, at 5-3 (jury instruction on
marshalling evidence).
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Havens because, as urged by counsel, the cooperating witness's testimony-
that Havens assisted him by sewing pockets from the cloth-was uncorrobo-
rated? If he did approve, would he permit defense counsel to argue the point
by reminding the jury that the contents of Havens's suitcase were never en-
tered into evidence? Neither truth-seeking nor deterrence observes the dis-
tinction between a factfinder's being kept in the dark or being positively
misled by the absence of the suppressed proof.20 8
In sum, it does not advance the analysis of truth-seeking and deterrence
to recast the question of the appropriate scope of rebuttal with suppressed
evidence as one of the fairness of inferences that may be drawn from the
absence of the proof. Where this determination is analogous to the admis-
sion of evidentiary rebuttal, it assures only that more highly probative, ille-
gally obtained proof will be admitted. The exclusion of James's statement
was "affirmatively misleading" only because he sought to force the prosecu-
tion to suffer the inferences that normally flow from the absence of the proof.
The rebuttal tests prohibit the defense from making effective use of its ab-
sence. As a result, the approach reinforces the inversely proportionate rela-
tionship between truth-seeking and deterrence and fails to resolve the
ambiguity of the consequences that flow from that relationship.
Although avoiding the arbitrariness of the impeachment approach, the
analogy to evidentiary rebuttal serves only to reproduce the question of how
the inferences should be allocated. Moreover, it does so in a context in
which the Court has offered no reason to believe that the probative value of
suppressed evidence will not define both its benefit to truth-seeking and its
cost to deterrence.
III. PRINCIPLES: PROHIBITING CONVICTION WITH ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED PROOF VERSUS PREVENTING PERJURY
The principled approach to the exception's boundaries derives from the
distinction drawn initially in Walder between the prosecution's "mak[ing] an
affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained" and allowing the defendant
to affirmatively resort to perjury by relying on the exclusionary rules as a
shield against contradiction of his untruths.20 9 Pursuant to this rationale,
the Court conceived that the exclusionary rules were not concerned primar-
208. Justice Kennedy's analysis of the impact of the exclusion of James's statement on truth-
seeking itself belied the distinction. He argued that failing to rebut the witness's testimony was
positively misleading because, among other things, the jury would expect the prosecution to present
rebuttal proof, if it had any. James, 493 U.S. at 325 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In the absence of
such proof, the jury would improperly conclude that no such proof existed and, thus, exclusion of
the evidence would positively corroborate the witness's account, rather than simply keep the jury "in
the dark." This argument proves too much; the absence of proof will always positively mislead in
precisely this sense. See Saltzburg, supra note 196, at 1019-23. What could be more "positively
misleading" than, to paraphrase Rule lOb-5, promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, keeping the jury in the dark about probative evidence "necessary in order to make the...
[evidence presented], in the light of the circumstances... not misleading?" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)
(1991).
209. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
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ily with deterring unlawful evidence-gathering. Instead, it viewed exclusion
as a necessary response to violations of constitutional rules, in order to avoid
becoming "participants" in the underlying violations. 210 But at the same
time, the courts are comparably implicated when the defendant uses court-
made exclusionary rules as a shield for perjury.211 The scope of the excep-
tion was defined by principles, whose violation would tarnish judicial integ-
rity, apart from the instrumental effects on deterrence or accurate
factfinding.
Despite the Court's formal rejection of the judicial integrity rationale for
the exclusionary rules and its acceptance of the truth-seeking/deterrence
balance,212 the principled approach continues to inform the exception's
scope. Drawing on Walder's language, the Court in Harris noted that "[t]he
shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use per-
jury. '213 In Havens, the Court noted that "[t]he defendant's obligation to
testify truthfully is fully binding on him when he is cross-examined," and
further that "[h]e would unquestionably be subject to a perjury prosecution
if he knowingly lies on cross-examination. ' '214 The majority in James used
the special concern with perjured, as opposed to merely false, testimony to
argue that the exception should not be extended to defense witnesses.215 The
analysis indicated that the Court's concern with being implicated in uncon-
tradicted perjury was separate from its concern with the instrumental effects
of false testimony on the accuracy of the factfinding process. 216 Finally,
Justice Kennedy's dissent in James also argued that extending the exception
to defense witnesses was consistent with the anti-perjury principle. It as-
serted that "[t]he perversion [of the exclusionary rules] is the same where the
perjury is by proxy" as where the defendant offers perjured testimony
himself.217
Harris, Hass, and Havens also reflected the competing concern that the
exception not permit the prosecution to secure a conviction by making af-
210. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 232 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (exclu-
sionary rules are based not only on the assumption of deterrence but also on the proposition that
admitting illegally obtained proof requires the courts to "aid or abet the law-breaking police of-
ficer"); James, 493 U.S. at 312 n.1 (noting that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens believe the
exclusionary rules are "designed not merely to deter police misconduct but also to prevent courts
from becoming parties to the constitutional violation by admitting illegally obtained evidence at
trial").
211. See, eg., Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351-52 (1990) (arguing that application of the
impeachment exception is especially appropriate when exclusion is a result of a violation of prophy-
lactic rules of criminal procedure, rather than a direct denial of a defendant's constitutional rights).
For a discussion of the exclusionary rules being judicially imposed rather than constitutionally com-
pelled, see Monaghan, supra note 4, at 3-10.
212. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976), the Court rejected the judicial integrity
rationale for the exclusionary rules only insofar as it had been used to suggest that there should be no
limitations on exclusion at all.
213. Harris, 401 U.S. at 226; see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (paraphrasing
Harris).
214. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980).
215. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314 (1990).
216. See text accompanying notes 83-90 supra.
217. James, 493 U.S. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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firmative use of illegal proof. The language in Walder, Harris, and Hass
indicating that the exception permits the use of illegally obtained evidence
for credibility purposes only,218 together with the Havens Court's injunction
against using illegally obtained evidence as substantive proof of guilt,2 19 all
demonstrate the Court's continuing concern that the jury use illegally ob-
tained evidence in a fashion designed to protect the defendant's right not to
be convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence, while realizing the
Court's desire to prevent perjury. Moreover, both opinions in James ex-
pressed the Court's fear that the cumulative effect of an unrestricted excep-
tion could eliminate all available defenses that a defendant might
meaningfully present, reflecting a similar concern that the exception not per-
mit conviction on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. Finally, the dis-
tinction suggested by Justice Kennedy's dissent between a jury's "being kept
in the dark" and being "positively misled" by the exclusion of illegally ob-
tained proof suggests a similar concern with limiting the use of the proof to a
perjury-preventing function.220
Viewing the scope of the exception as the product of these principles, the
Court's central task is to distinguish between the affirmative and negative
uses of illegally obtained evidence. In so doing, the Court would define
boundaries to the exception that would identify both perjury and the affirma-
tive use of illegally obtained evidence as noninstrumental wrongs having
equal impact upon the integrity of the criminal trial process. 221 Pursuant to
this principled approach, the purpose of the exception is to eliminate jury
reliance on defense perjury by "neutralizing" it, without allowing the prose-
cution to prove its affirmative case with illegally obtained evidence. Thus,
the rules and the exception would allow the judiciary to avoid participating
in violations of either principle.
A. Preventing the Defense from Resorting to "Perury"
Unfortunately, the track record of the principled approach is as dismal
as that of the policy approach. First, the Court has obtained little assistance
from its anti-perjury rationale. The cases demonstrate that its implications
for the scope of the exception are far too broad to provide meaningful gui-
218. In Harris v New York, 401 U.S. 222, 223 (1971), the Court noted that the "trial judge
instructed the jury that the statements attributed to petitioner by the prosecution could be consid-
ered only in passing on petitioner's credibility and not as evidence of guilt." In Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 721 (1975), the Court noted that the "trial court instructed the jury that the statements
attributed to... [defendant] could be used only in passing on his credibility and not as evidence of
guilt." In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64 (1954), the Court noted that the "trial judge...
carefully charged the jury that ... [the evidence] was not to be used to determine whether the
defendant had committed the crimes . . . charged, but solely for the purpose of impeaching the
defendant's credibility."
219. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980).
220. See James, 493 U.S. at 324 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying note 206
supra.
221. See, eg., United States ex rel. Padgett v. Russell, 332 F. Supp. 41, 43 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(balancing "the right of a criminal defendant to be free from the effects of improper custodial inter-
rogation and the right of society to counteract the effect of possibly perjured testimony").
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dance. The James majority used the rationale to argue for limiting the ex-
ception to defendant testimony, because that testimony is more likely to be
perjured. The James minority used the rationale to permit the contradiction
of any perjured testimony, whatever its source. The concern with "perjury"
in this context, however, is intended to prevent the courts from being impli-
cated in a violation of the integrity of a criminal trial, and is not necessarily
concerned with preventing the crime of giving knowingly false testimony.
As a result, the anti-perjury rationale has not been helpful in choosing be-
tween these approaches. Moreover, any approach derived from the anti-per-
jury rationale requires a judge to sacrifice her impartiality by determining
that a defense is false. Because of the difficulties in defining the "perjury" to
which the exception should apply and in justifying the courts' necessary role
in identifying it, the anti-perjury rationale has yielded arbitrary limitations
on the exception.
The distinction between impeachment of defense witnesses and defend-
ants is not easily accommodated by the anti-perjury principle. 222 The James
majority attempted to do so by positing a correlation between a defendant's
interest and the likelihood of intentionally false testimony. Assuming the
correlation to exist, however, does not establish the commission of perjury in
any given case, unless one concludes-contrary to instructions that courts
routinely give to juries-that falsity, much less perjury, can be inferred from
the defendant's interest alone.223
In addition, the practical application of the anti-perjury rationale would
require courts to make a preliminary determination that the contradicted
testimony was not only false, but intentionally false. Although some may
favor this procedure because it permits the admission of more convincing
contradicting proof, it contravenes the principle of judicial impartiality and
subverts the defendant's presumption of innocence and his right to trial by
jury.224 As a result, even while relying upon the anti-perjury principle to
justify the exception, the Court has disclaimed any judicial role in the per-
jury determination. Instead, the Court has claimed that the exception only
enables the jury to make an informed credibility determination. 225 The obvi-
ous flaw in this scheme is that it is incapable of principled limitation: All
impeachment proof would merit admission on that ground.
In addition to being unable to reconcile preliminary determinations of
222. For example, although the Court in James depicted the issue as the "extension" of the
exception to defense witnesses, there was no necessary reason to do so. Many lower courts had
already assumed that the application of the exception to defense witnesses, as suggested by the James
minority, followed from Walder's anti-peijury rationale. See, eg., United States ex reL Castillo v.
Fay, 350 F.2d 400, 402 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1019 (1966); Hendrickson v. State, 290
Ark. 319, 719 S.W.2d 420, 424 (1986); People v. Payne, 98 Ill. 2d 45, 456 N.E.2d 44, 46 (1983), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 1036 (1984); Commonwealth v. Wright, 234 Pa. Super. 83, 87, 339 A.2d 103, 106
(1975).
223. See 1 L. SAND ET AL., supra note 84, 5 7.01, at 7-11.
224. Although the courts make findings of defendant perjury for sentencing purposes, those
findings follow a jury's deliberation and decision.
225. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971); see also Padgett, 332 F. Supp. at 43
(noting that the exception permits contradiction of "possibly perjured testimony") (emphasis added).
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perjury with the judicial role in a criminal trial, the Court has been unable to
explain why perjured testimony is the only threat to the integrity of a crimi-
nal trial. We can all agree that perjury is a crime, but the applicable crimi-
nal penalties exist to punish and prevent that crime. The exception purports
to prevent judicial participation in violations of the integrity of the trial pro-
cess, not to supplement criminal penalties. If the integrity of that process is
violated only by a defendant's perjury, and requires only that intentionally
false testimony be contradicted, then why should James, for instance, suffer
a murder conviction for resorting to perjury?226 If integrity is violated by
any falsehood, regardless of whether a witness has committed perjury, then
why should the exception not extend to "perjury by proxy" (as Justice Ken-
nedy described the testimony of James's defense witness)? Moreover, should
the exception not extend equally to false inferences created by defense coun-
sel's cross-examination or argument? Who is more the defendant's proxy
than his counsel? In short, if the Court is concerned with perjury's effect on
the integrity of the criminal trial, rather than on the unexposed commission
of the crime, then it should evaluate whether the defense, however presented,
is knowingly false, without limiting itself to any specific witness's
testimony. 227
Due to the difficulties in defining "perjury" in this context, and in justify-
ing a judicial finding of perjury, however defined, the Court has been unable
to employ the anti-perjury rationale consistently. At most, it has noted that
the exception prevents the defendant from using the "shield" of the exclu-
sionary rules to resort to perjurious testimony. It does so simply by subject-
ing that testimony to normal evidentiary processes. The Court has relied on
the anti-perjury rationale to argue that without an impeachment exception,
perjury may go uncontradicted. Presumably, one is then supposed to con-
clude that because nobody could defend perjury, nobody could oppose an
impeachment exception in principle. But this argument says nothing about
whether the rationale yields justifiable limitations on the exception's applica-
tion or, indeed, any limitations at all. Moreover, the cases belie the argu-
ment that the specter of perjury requires the exception as a matter of
principle. Insofar as Walder permitted a defendant's impeachment only
with evidence relating to collateral matters, it tolerated the possibility of per-
jury by a defendant on those matters that were most important to the trial-
the denial of "all the elements of the case against him." 228
226. Some courts have held that Walder permits the use of illegally obtained evidence in a
subsequent perjury prosecution. See 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 205, § 11.6(c), at 498-99, and cases
cited therein. Nonetheless, those courts have not considered why the impeachment exception is not
entirely redundant. See, ag., United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854, 857-58 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 862 (1976).
227. After all, although perjury by a defendant or defense witness is at least potentially subject
to criminal penalty, perjury by proxy-the presentation of a knowingly false defense-is virtually
immune from such liability.
228. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
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B. Prohibiting Conviction with Illegally Obtained Proof. The Court's
Evidentiary Approach
Because the anti-perjury principle fails to define adequate boundaries to
the exception, the Court's principled perspective has focused upon distin-
guishing between affirmative and negative uses of illegally obtained proof,
using evidentiary analogies to prohibit the former and to permit the latter.
In the current approach, the Court relies entirely on limiting instructions to
restrict the factfinder's use of illegally obtained proof. These instructions
purport to permit the jury to use the proof only to contradict the defendant's
case and not to further that of the prosecution. This approach thus draws an
analogy between the affirmative use of the evidence and its role in fulfilling
the prosecution's ultimate burden of proof. In a previous approach, the
Court permitted the prosecution to impeach the defendant only on collateral
matters, permitting the defendant to deny the elements of the prosecution's
case-in-chief without risking impeachment with illegally obtained proof.
This approach drew an analogy between the negative use of illegally ob-
tained proof and the collateral evidence rule, which governs impeachment of
defense evidence with extrinsic proof. The following sections analyze these
approaches and argue that both are incapable of establishing a distinction
between affirmative and negative uses of illegally obtained proof capable of
supplying a coherent analysis of the boundaries of the exception.
1. The burden of proof
In its current distinction between affirmative and negative uses of ille-
gally obtained proof, the Court uses limiting instructions to assure that the
jury uses illegally obtained evidence only to neutralize possible defense per-
jury, not to compromise the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt with lawful evidence. These instructions reflect the typical
jury instruction on witness credibility, which charges the jury (at most) to
disregard the testimony of a witness known to have intentionally given false
testimony, but does not suggest that it draw any affirmative inferences from
the fact that the witness lied. 229 Accordingly, the Court relies on an analogy
between the permissible "negative" use of illegally obtained evidence in ex-
posing defense perjury and its use only for credibility purposes. It apparently
expects the factfinder, at most, to discount the defense evidence entirely, but
not to consider any affirmative inferences from the perjury that would relieve
the prosecution from establishing its burden of proving guilt with lawful
evidence.
Consequently, the ideal instruction on illegal proof would advise the jury
to consider that proof if and only if it finds: (1) that the prosecution's case,
considered alone, establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) that
the defense case, if believed, establishes a reasonable doubt.23 0 The jury
would then consider illegally obtained evidence only to evaluate the credibil-
229. See, e.g., 1 L. SAND ET AL., supra note 84, 7.01, at 7-69 (instruction on trial perjury).
230. I am indebted to my colleague Mike Martin for this formulation.
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ity of defense evidence. Thus, any role the illegal evidence might play in
securing a conviction would be justified by the perceived need to prevent the
defendant from using the exclusionary rules as a shield for perjury.
Notwithstanding the analogy to the burden of proof, no instruction could
cause the factfinder to evaluate the prosecution's case independently without
also considering it in light of the defense evidence presented. In turn, that
evidence can only be evaluated in light of the illegally obtained contradicting
proof. The law of evidence provides no analogous model for a deliberation
of this kind. 231 The only available analogue is the distinction between af-
firmative and negative proof applied by judges in deciding the legal suffi-
ciency of the prosecution's case. But that model is inappropriate. Sufficiency
determinations do not require decisions about the credibility of the prosecu-
tion's proof. Instead, the court construes all reasonable inferences against
the defendant. Thus, there is no basis for applying this analysis to decision-
making by an ultimate factfinder. Unlike a court making a sufficiency deter-
mination, the factfinder must evaluate the credibility of, and factual
inferences from, the evidence as a whole, not make judgments about the evi-
dence in isolation.
The courts' persistent resort to the inapt "truth of the matter asserted"
instruction to limit a jury's use of illegally obtained evidence further indi-
cates that it is inappropriate to interject a sufficiency determination into the
deliberations of the ultimate factfinder. That instruction, which limits the
factual inferences that may be drawn from the proof, attempts to approxi-
mate the ideal deliberation insofar as it may be reconciled with the jury's
factfinding function. However, the instruction is no more successful at ef-
fecting the ideal deliberation than it is at identifying the limited factual infer-
ences that may be drawn from the proof. Moreover, no acceptable
instruction exists that is consistent with the jury's factfinding function.232
231. Nor do judges make a clearly analogous determination about the legal sufficiency of the
prosecution's case standing alone once the defendant has presented proof. Some courts have held
that by presenting proof after denial of a motion for acquittal, the defendant waives his right to
challenge the sufficiency of the prosecution's proof standing alone. See, eg., United States v.
Maniego, 710 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1202, 1208 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974). This rule of "waiver" is explicable only by a different
assumption about the distinction between affirmative and negative uses of proof depending upon
whether the issue is one of legal sufficiency or factfinding. The rule that the defendant waives suffi-
ciency challenges by presenting evidence presupposes that a jury may make affirmative use of the
defendant's presentation of false evidence. If the jury were prohibited from drawing any affirmative
inferences from the falsity of the defendant's proof and were permitted at most to disregard it, the
decisions on the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of the prosecution's case, and at the close of
all the evidence, would necessarily be made on precisely the same record. Thus, the defendant would
waive nothing by presenting a case. The "waiver" rule applied at trial, therefore, acknowledges that
permissibly treating the defendant's evidence as a fabrication is unlike merely discounting that
evidence.
232. The one commentator who noted early on that the hearsay-derived instruction was inap-
propriate, for example, was able to propose no acceptable alternative. He implicitly suggested that
courts should simply instruct the jury to use illegally obtained evidence for credibility purposes only
and then reinforce the point by telling it the reasons why its consideration of the proof need be
restricted. See Haddad, supra note 152, at 42. Such an instruction, however, does nothing to assist
the jury in deciding what using the evidence for credibility purposes only means in this context. On
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The Supreme Court has been unable to distinguish negative and affirma-
tive uses of illegally obtained evidence by isolating its use only for credibility
purposes. In Loper v. Beto,233 for instance, it established a clear preference
for admitting illegally obtained evidence that impeaches a defendant's spe-
cific credibility, by contradicting particular exculpatory factual assertions in
his testimony.234 At the same time, the Court refuses to admit unlawfully
obtained general credibility evidence, such as proof of prior convictions or
specific acts of conduct probative of character for untruthfulness. 235 This
preference clearly contradicts the Court's "credibility only" doctrine. Spe-
cific credibility evidence may often be used as affirmative proof of guilt, with
only a tangential effect on credibility determinations. Meanwhile, general
credibility evidence can only be used to neutralize perjury; the rules of evi-
dence themselves prohibit any affirmative use. If the Court were truly distin-
guishing between affirmative and negative uses of proof according to
whether the factfinder is likely to use it for credibility inferences only, the
preference would be reversed in favor of admitting general credibility
proof.23 6
It is not surprising that the analogy to witness credibility instructions
cannot support the Court's "negative-use only" doctrine. Although the typi-
cal witness credibility instruction does not invite the factfinder to draw af-
firmative inferences of facts from perjured testimony, evidentiary principles
do allow some affirmative uses for proof of perjury. Classic jury instructions
invite the factfinder to use, as affirmative proof of the defendant's conscious-
ness of guilt, perjury237 or falsification of evidence2 38 by a defendant. In
the other hand, such an instruction gives the jury a dangerous opportunity to improperly consider
the exclusionary rules and defendants who use the rules to their advantage.
233. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
234. See id. at 482 n.l (distinguishing illegally obtained evidence "rebutting a specific false
statement made from the witness stand" from evidence "blackening [the witness's] character and
thus damaging his general credibility in the eyes of the jury" and implying that only the former
should be permitted under the impeachment exception); White, supra note 29, at 1496, and cases
cited therein ("the Supreme Court [has] made it quite clear that specific credibility decisions such as
Walder and Harris are irrelevant to general credibility problems").
235. See FED. R. EvID. 608, 609.
236. One commentator has endorsed the Court's restrictive attitude toward admitting general
credibility proof, claiming that such proof, in contrast to specific credibility proof, "exposes no lies."
White, supra note 29, at 1497. If taken to mean that general credibility proof provides no evidence
of perjury at all, then the claim implies that all general credibility proof should be excluded regard-
less of whether it is illegally obtained. Its evidentiary value as proof of perjury is its sole justification
under the rules of evidence. If taken to mean that general credibility proof is less persuasive evidence
of perjury than specific credibility proof-which is assuredly what the commentator meant and what
the Court implies by its exclusion of general credibility proof-then the claim belies the meaningful-
ness of the distinction between affirmative and negative uses of specific credibility evidence. Specific
credibility evidence is more persuasive proof of perjury than general credibility evidence precisely
because it affirmatively proves the existence of a fact that exposes the lie in testimony denying that
fact.
237. See 1 L. SAND ET AL., supra note 84, 6.05, at 6-35 (false exculpatory statements are
such powerful evidence of guilt that an instruction is necessary to highlight that the proof shows at
most defendant's belief that he was guilty and to caution the jury that it "may not... infer on [that]
... basis... alone, that the defendant is, in fact, guilty of the crime for which he is charged"); cf.
United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1972). Owens illustrates that limitations on the
use of evidence showing consciousness of guilt are not derived from a distinction between affirmative
1354 [Vol. 44:1301
THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
addition, the jury is likely to view proof of a knowingly false defense argu-
ment or intentionally misleading cross-examination as the functional
equivalent of perjury advanced on the defendant's behalf.239 Any suggestion
of perjury in any fashion connected to the defense is powerful affirmative
proof. Indeed, the suggestion of consciousness of guilt is powerful enough
proof to warrant a balancing instruction cautioning the jury that the proof
does not necessarily establish guilt.24 °
Therefore, it is impossible to use jury instructions to assure that illegally
obtained proof will be used only to evaluate the credibility of the defendant's
case. As a practical matter, the principle prohibiting affirmative use of proof
is, at most, an assurance that a court will not consider such proof in deter-
mining the legal sufficiency of the prosecution's case. Yet, the Court's efforts
to limit the use of the proof by the factfinder clearly demonstrate its belief
that a sufficiency determination is inadequate to prevent conviction with ille-
gal proof. There is an enormous gap between a merely sufficient criminal
case and one that proves the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The protection provided by the reasonable doubt standard is among the
most fundamental principles defining the integrity of the criminal process. 2 4 1
Moreover, the difference between a sufficient and a successful criminal prose-
cution also includes the protection afforded a defendant by his constitutional
right to trial by jury. Where is the protection against conviction with ile-
gally obtained evidence when a judge ascertains only that the prosecution's
lawfully obtained evidence meets the mere threshold test of sufficiency?
Finally, the notion of protecting the defendant's right not to be convicted
with illegally obtained proof through judicial review of the sufficiency of the
prosecution's lawful evidence fails to address the cases in which illegally ob-
tained proof has been used to rebut misleading cross-examination or argu-
ment. Is such proof part of the prosecution's affirmative case for purposes of
assessing its sufficiency? If so, 2 4 2 that result appears to conflict with the
and negative uses of such proof. Id. Instead, these limitations flow from the belief that such proof is
not probative at all of certain technical elements. Id. Thus, where it is the only proof purporting to
establish the technical elements, evidence of consciousness of guilt is insufficient to prove the prose-
cution's case. Id. at 470-71.
238. See I L. SAND ET AL., supra note 84, 6.05, at 6-38 (defendant's falsification of evidence,
presumably including the procuring of false defense witness testimony, is such powerful proof of
consciousness of guilt that an instruction is necessary to caution the jury against inferring, on the
basis of such proof alone, that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged).
239. The point is illustrated by the time-proven rhetorical technique of discrediting an oppos-
ing party's case by treating his counsel's cross-examination or argument as the equivalent of a false
exculpatory statement or the knowing presentation of false evidence.
240. See notes 237-238 supra and accompanying text.
241. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-63, 367-68 (1970) (citing Supreme Court precedents
indicating that the reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally required, and holding that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is required during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency
proceeding).
242. Ironically, these cases have attracted support among commentators otherwise hostile to
the exception. See, eg., 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 205, § 11.6(b). Moreover, commentators sympa-
thetic to extending the exception to defense witnesses have supported the extension, in part, to pre-
serve the exception's application to cross-examination and argument. See, e.g., Comment, supra note
135, at 165 n.56.
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principled goal purportedly accomplished by requiring a sufficient case of
lawful evidence. If not, it is unrealistic to expect a judge to ignore proof that
she has ruled is necessary to rebut misleading cross-examination or argu-
ment and thereby dismiss the case to protect the defendant from conviction
with the illegal evidence.
In sum, limiting instructions cannot restrict the factfinder from assessing
the prosecution's case through affirmative use of proof admitted by way of
the impeachment exception. They also hopelessly confuse the appropriate
roles of the jury and the trial court. The imagined instructions capable of
communicating the distinction between the affirmative and negative uses of
illegally obtained proof are inappropriate with respect to the ultimate
factfinder, whose task respects no such distinction. At the same time, the
continuing quest for the appropriate instructions reveals that the principled
rationale for the exception's boundaries collapses without some means of
denying the decisive effect of illegal proof in a criminal trial.
2. The collateral use doctrine.
Before the Supreme Court began to rely exclusively on limiting instruc-
tions to prevent the affirmative use of illegal proof, the lower courts at-
tempted to serve this goal by excluding entirely all illegal proof that was not
"collateral" to the crimes charged.243 They derived the collateral use doc-
trine from the Walder Court's explanation of why Walder had been appro-
priately impeached with illegally obtained proof while Agnello had not.
According to the Walder Court, "the Constitution guarantees a defendant
the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him" by leaving him
"free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving
leave to the Government to introduce ... evidence illegally secured." 244
Walder was thus free to deny that he had possessed heroin on the occasions
for which he was on trial-as Agnello had denied knowing possession of
cocaine on the occasion for which he was charged-without incurring the
admission of illegal evidence of prior possession. Unlike Agnello, however,
Walder "[oif his own accord... went beyond a mere denial of complicity in
the crimes ...charged" and claimed to have never possessed heroin.245
Therefore, it was proper to admit the evidence of Walder's prior heroin pos-
session to challenge the credibility of that assertion because the proof was
collateral to the issue of guilt.24 6
The collateral use doctrine was inspired by the evidentiary concept of
collateral evidence employed in the rule prohibiting impeachment on collat-
eral matters. That analogy also proved to be inappropriate and failed to
define rationally the scope of the impeachment exception. Even before the
243. See The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. CM. L. REv. 939, 942
n.16 (1967); White, supra note 29, at 1479; Note, supra note 29, at 923-25.
244. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
245. Id.
246. See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 228-30 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rely-
ing on the collateral use doctrine).
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Harris Court overruled the collateral use doctrine in favor of limiting in-
structions prohibiting the affirmative use of illegal proof, many lower courts
had rejected the distinction between collateral and noncollateral uses of the
evidence.
The collateral evidence rule generally prohibits extrinsic proof, the sole
purpose of which is to establish the existence of a contradiction. 247 For im-
peachment purposes, courts generally define collateral evidence as contra-
dicting proof that is not relevant to issues in the case, apart from simply
impeaching a witness's credibility. 248 Independently relevant impeachment
is not considered collateral, and would therefore not be admissible under the
impeachment exception. Accordingly, by drawing an analogy between fie-
gally obtained impeachment proof admissible under Walder and collateral
impeachment evidence, the courts attempted to construe Walder as permit-
ting the prosecution to use only "negative" illegal proof that merely contra-
dicted the defendant's evidence, but not "affirmative" proof that established
the elements of its case. Therefore, the impeachment exception would per-
mit such proof only to discredit the defendant's evidence and thus expose
possible perjury.
Walder's unique evidentiary context furthered the notion that the excep-
tion permitted the introduction of collateral evidence. The proof admitted in
Walder was character evidence, proved by specific acts of the defendant's
conduct, the use of which as "affirmative" evidence of an element of the
prosecution's case was problematic under the rules of evidence. Thus, it was
possible to interpret Walder as only permitting the introduction of illegally
obtained proof that had no permissible affirmative use under the rules of
evidence and was, thus, collateral. 249
To begin with, had Walder not volunteered his prior nonpossession, the
rules of evidence would have prohibited the prosecution from introducing
the proof regardless of whether it was obtained illegally; unlike other ille-
gally obtained proof, the prosecution's character evidence is permissible only
as evidentiary rebuttal and not as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief.250
247. E. CLEARY, supra note 159, § 47, at 109-10. It is now generally acknowledged that the
collateral evidence rule finds expression in FED. R. EVID. 403. See ag., C. MUELLER & L.
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 174, at 681.
248. If the contradicting evidence is relevant to the credibility of the witness apart from simply
establishing the contradiction, then the extrinsic proof is not collateral. Furthermore, contradicting
proof that is central to the witness's testimony is not collateral if it is impossible that the witness's
account is merely mistaken in the contradicted particular if the contradicting proof be true. It is
often said that such proof calls into question the trustworthiness of the witness's entire testimony.
See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS & PROBLEMS 454-57 (2d
ed. 1988).
249. Commentators sympathetic to the exclusionary rules uniformly made this assumption
about Walder in arguing that the evidence was properly admitted in that case only because it was not
probative of Walder's guilt. See The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, supra note
243, at 941 (evidence in Walder "could not have influenced the jury on the question of guilt");
White, supra note 29, at 1482 n.44 (evidence in Walder unlikely to be "misused" as "direct" evidence
of guilt because it was related to a prior offense and not the present charge); Note, supra note 29, at
916 (evidence in Walder "had no bearing on the issues central to the case before the Court").
250. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
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Thus, one could characterize the proof as falling outside the prosecution's
affirmative case. Second, the rules are silent about whether character rebut-
tal can be used only to negate the defendant's exculpatory character infer-
ence or also affirmatively to establish an inculpatory character inference on
which the factfinder might properly rely.251 Although it is hard to envision
how such proof might rebut an exculpatory character inference without es-
tablishing an inculpatory one, the character rules are especially wary of a
factfinder's use of an inculpatory inference'from character proof in deciding
the issue of guilt.2 5 2
Finally, not only was the evidence at issue in Walder character rebuttal,
whose status as affirmative evidence is already problematic, but it was also
proved by specific acts of the defendant's conduct. Even where evidentiary
rules permit character rebuttal, they limit it to the weaker form of opinion or
reputation testimony,253 unless a defendant testifies to specific instances of
conduct. In that case, courts ordinarily will permit the prosecution to re-
spond in kind with proof of the defendant's conduct.254 But as a quid pro
quo, courts will minimize prejudice to the defendant by only admitting the
proof subject to an instruction limiting its use to the issue of the defendant's
credibility. 255 Thus, even if the rules permit the factfinder to draw an incul-
patory propensity inference from character rebuttal established by opinion
or reputation testimony, that inference would nonetheless be prohibited
where the prosecution was allowed to rebut the defendant's character evi-
dence with the more powerful proof of specific instances of the defendant's
conduct.256 For these reasons, unique to the evidentiary context, the Court
may have thought Walder's impeachment justified because the type of im-
peachment proof admitted did not provide affirmative proof of guilt. By
permitting the prosecution to respond with its character rebuttal proof, the
Court had not admitted proof with a permissible affirmative use. Also,
Walder had opened an "entire subject which... [evidence] law has kept
251. McCormick on Evidence contradicts itself on this score, claiming on one hand that the
prosecution's character rebuttal properly is "circumstantial evidence of whether... [the defendant]
committed the act charged," E. CLEARY, supra note 159, § 191, at 568, and on the other that such
proof can be used affirmatively only to prove "whether he committed the act charged with the
requisite state of mind," id. The treatise asserts both propositions without acknowledging any con-
tradiction between them. The latter approach contemplates that the proof might be used affirma-
tively, but only for a purpose permitted by FED. R. EVID. 404(b), that is, one other than to establish
the prohibited action-in-conformity-with-character inference, even though the evidence could prop-
erly be used to rebut the propensity inference that the defendant would have the jury draw from an
exculpatory character trait. Since nothing in Walder suggested that the proof was admitted for any
permissible purpose recognized under FED. R. EvID. 404(b), it was not implausible to perceive it as
having no permissible affirmative purpose whatsoever.
252. See note 251 supra.
253. FED. R. EvID. 405(a). Rule 405(a) codified the existing common law prohibition on
proving character by specific acts. See C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 174, at 489.
254. See, eg., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64 (1954) (defendant's testimony allowed
prosecution to bring up prior drug-related acts in rebuttal).
255. See United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1469 n.1 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
143 (1991); cf United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979).
256. See, e.g., Sanders, 929 F.2d at 1469 n.l.
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closed for his benefit."'257
The analogy between impeachment evidence admitted under Walder and
collateral evidence, however, was beset by a basic contradiction. The collat-
eral evidence rule prohibits only extrinsic, not intrinsic, proof of collateral
impeachment. Thus, reading Walder narrowly as permitting the admission
of collateral impeachment proof with no permissible affirmative evidentiary
purpose is inconsistent with the anti-perjury principle. Such a reading
would leave the defendant free to deny the illegally obtained proof without
fear of contradiction by extrinsic evidence. Assuming that defendants do not
routinely "confess" to illegally obtained proof when confronted with it on
cross-examination, the exception would facilitate, rather than discourage,
perjury. The collateral evidence doctrine tolerates false testimony on a col-
lateral matter in order to avoid confusion of the issues, undue consumption
of time, and unfair prejudice that might result from the extrinsic proof of
collateral matters. 258 The anti-perjury principle does not knowingly tolerate
false testimony of any kind.
On the other hand, a broader reading of Walder suggested either an ex-
ception to the collateral evidence rule, particularly created to promote the
admission of illegal proof against a criminal defendant, or an acknowledge-
ment that the collateral use doctrine permitted illegal noncollateral impeach-
ment proof. The first alternative was highly implausible. The latter
alternative was more likely, but it highlighted the inappropriateness of the
evidentiary analogy and offered the courts little guidance as to the excep-
tion's boundaries. One could read Walder as permitting noncollateral ex-
trinsic proof of impeachment evidence with no permissible affirmative
purpose. That reading, however, would suggest that Walder was virtually
sui generis. Only infrequently will proof with no permissible evidentiary
purpose besides contradicting a defendant's testimony be permitted to be
proved extrinsically by the collateral evidence rule. Assuming Walder was
not limited to impeachment proof that is "collateral" in its evidentiary sense,
and thus admitted relevant evidence that is normally admitted on the prose-
cution's affirmative case, it offered little guidance on how to construe its
holding that a defendant's testimony denying the "elements of the prosecu-
tion's case" was protected from contradiction.
Walder, therefore, postponed rather than resolved the question of the
appropriate scope of the exception. Several lower courts completed the anal-
ogy between the exception and collateral impeachment evidence by prohibit-
ing illegally obtained extrinsic proof of contradicting facts after the
defendant denied those facts on cross-examination. 259 Considering the ex-
257. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948).
258. See C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 174, at 681 (stating that the "concerns
which lead to exclusion of counterproof which contradicts on collateral points are very much the
concerns which find expression in FRE 403 and 611").
259. See, eg., United States v. Batts, 558 F.2d 513, 516-18 (9th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. United
States, 344 F.2d 163, 165 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Birrell, 276 F. Supp. 798, 817 n.23
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); see also JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, I EVIDENCE § 15, at 70 (3d ed. Supp. 1964); The
Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, supra note 243, at 947; Note, supra note 29, at
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ception's anti-perjury rationale, such a result was inconsistent with Walder.
Although construing Walder to permit the prosecution to use illegally ob-
tained evidence on cross-examination, those courts refused to take the next
logical step by permitting the evidence to be proved extrinsically when per-
jury was most likely to be exposed. In Walder itself, for example, applica-
tion of the collateral evidence rule would have barred the prosecution from
introducing the heroin obtained in the illegal search, after the impeachment
exception permitted the prosecution to inquire about it on cross-examination
and Walder specifically denied its possession. Similarly, if Walder involved a
virtually unique circumstance in which evidentiary principles would permit
extrinsic proof of impeachment evidence allowed by the exception, then, as
several commentators noted, the exception was hardly worth its administra-
tive costs. 260 To read Walder narrowly was to justify its reversal or to
render it largely irrelevant; to read it more broadly was to venture into un-
charted territory.
Stripped of the analogy to collateral evidence, most courts attempted to
define the collateral use of illegal proof based on its probative value as proof
of the crime charged, which conceded that evidence admitted under the ex-
ception had permissible affirmative uses under the rules of evidence, and
thus differed radically from the meaning of "collateral" in its analogous evi-
dentiary context.261 The lower courts' interpretations of collateral use
ranged (sometimes within the same opinions) from the requirement that the
proof be "unrelated to the crime charged, '262 to a requirement that it only
be "indirectly related to the crime charged, ' 263 to a requirement that it only
not be "per se" inculpatory.264 But once the courts recognized that the evi-
dence permitted under the exception could be affirmative proof of the prose-
cution's case-and indeed typically had to be such proof in order to evade
919 (noting that the collateral use doctrine applied by the courts to determine when illegally ob-
tained evidence may be admitted pursuant to the impeachment exception "violates the 'collateral
matters' rule" and arguing that Walder was wrongly decided on that basis).
260. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 152, at 30; The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rules, supra note 243, at 947; Note, supra note 29, at 919.
261. See, e.g., Note, supra note 29, at 916-17 (noting that while some courts had required
contradicting proof to be unrelated to the "elements of the case" in order to be "collateral," others
had required it to be unrelated to the "elements of the crime," and arguing that both definitions were
broader than the definition of collateral evidence required by Walder).
262. Recent Cases, 24 VAND. L. REv. 843, 844 (1971) (describing Walder as permitting im-
peachment of defendant's testimony on issue unrelated to pending charges); see also Tate v. United
States, 283 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (admitting evidence of "lawful proper acts").
263. Recent Cases, supra note 262, at 845 n.14; see also Johnson v United States, 344 F.2d 163,
166 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (reversing convictions because prosecution had introduced illegally obtained
statements bearing directly on defendant's guilt or innocence); Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d 542,
543 (D.C. Cir.) (allowing admission of impeachment on "minor points"), cert denied, 377 U.S. 972
(1964); United States ex rel Dixon v. Cavell, 284 F. Supp. 535, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (admitting
evidence not directly pertaining to the elements of the crime).
264. Recent Cases, supra note 262, at 845 n.13; see also United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904,
910 n.3 (2d Cir. 1965) (inculpatory statement can be used to impeach defendant so long as it is not a
"confession to the crime for which he... [is] being tried"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966); Tate
283 F.2d at 380 (jury entitled to hear illegally obtained statement of testifying defendant so long as
not "per se inculpatory"); Cavell, 284 F. Supp. at 540 (statement proof collateral so long as it does
not "admit the very acts that are essential elements of the crime charged").
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the traditional bar on collateral evidence-they could no longer justify the
proper scope of the exception by reference to the underlying principles of
preventing perjury and prohibiting conviction with illegally obtained proof.
To the extent that the proposed tests distinguished degrees of probative
value of admittedly affirmative proof, they were hardly consistent with the
notion that any conviction based on illegally obtained proof entails judicial
participation in the underlying illegality.
By the time the Court decided Harris, the lower courts had criticized the
collateral use doctrine as meaningless. Those courts, liberated from
Walder's precedent by the dictum in Miranda v. Arizona (suggesting that use
of statements taken in violation of Miranda's required warnings amounted
to self-incrimination even if the statement was exculpatory) argued that Mi-
randa implicitly overruled the impeachment exception. They asserted that
Miranda recognized what the lower courts had already learned in applying
the collateral use doctrine-that the use of illegally obtained evidence as
proof of guilt has no meaningful correlation with the question of whether
relevant evidence can be labelled as collateral to the crime charged. 265 Over-
ruling the collateral use requirement, the Court in Harris adopted the fiction
of effective limiting instructions to claim that the exception was consistent
with principles preventing both perjury and conviction with illegal proof,
despite the admission of noncollateral impeachment. 26 6 But as the lower
courts' experience with the collateral use doctrine demonstrates, the Court
was asking a jury to draw a distinction between the aflirmative and negative
uses of illegally obtained proof that judges had already concluded could not
prevent the defendant's conviction with illegal proof. Meanwhile, the Harris
dissenters also ignored the experience of the lower courts and endorsed the
collateral use doctrine, claiming that proper restrictions on the evidentiary
uses of unlawful proof can prevent judicial participation in governmental
illegality and defense perjury. 267
In sum, viewing the scope of the impeachment exception to reflect princi-
ples prohibiting both defense perjury and conviction with illegal proof,
rather than policies of truth-seeking and deterrence, is equally inadequate in
defining coherent boundaries to the exception. Unlike the evidentiary prin-
ciples of burden of proof or collateral impeachment evidence, the criminal
trial process does not distinguish between affirmative and negative proof of
guilt. As a result, the principled approach degenerates into an ungoverned
judicial balance between competing principles and reproduces, rather than
resolves, the problem of choosing among alternative boundaries to the excep-
tion. Nonetheless, the Court continues to perpetuate the fiction that the ex-
265. See Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 179 (9th Cir. 1968) (evidence can be of
lawful proper acts, relate to a minor point, and be collateral to the principal issues in the case but
nonetheless be directly related to the defendant's defense; thus, distinctions used to determine when
evidence is permissible under Walder are "essentially meaningless"); United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d
97, 103 (2d Cir. 1968) (same).
266. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
267. See note 290 infra and accompanying text.
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ception is consistent with both principles. It claims that the exception
prohibits the prosecution from using illegal evidence affirmatively, while it
permits its use only to neutralize potential defense perjury, however that
term may be defined. The principles prohibiting conviction with illegally
obtained proof on the one hand, and defense perjury on the other, are incon-
sistent in practice, but the notion that they may be equally respected by the
judiciary buttresses the truth-seeking/deterrence balance, preventing it from
eliminating either the exclusionary rules or the impeachment exception en-
tirely. Although the principled approach fails to generate boundary doc-
trines consistent with its premises, it legitimizes the notion of compromising
constitutional criminal procedure and the principles of evidence, and thus
assures the continued existence of the impeachment exception.
IV. THE POLITICS OF THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
A. The Illusion of Neutrality
The impeachment exception represents a compromise between eviden-
tiary principles and constitutional criminal procedure. Its legitimacy is
based on the belief that it is possible to accommodate both within a neutral
framework. That framework, however, has continually failed to provide a
coherent application of the exclusionary rules or the impeachment excep-
tion. Whether viewing the exception as a principled limitation on the scope
of the exclusionary rules or as a concession to a competing policy, the Court
has been unable to formulate boundaries to the exception that can accom-
plish the goals of both the rules and the exception. Until limitations on the
rules are rooted in their underlying purposes, rather than in competing prin-
ciples or policies, the boundaries to the exception will remain arbitrary.
One need look no further than the exception's present boundaries to ap-
preciate that arbitrariness. If a defendant testifies, the courts will admit vir-
tually any relevant unlawful evidence in response, on the pretense that the
proof will not be used "substantively" or "affirmatively" to establish guilt.
In Michigan v. Harvey, for example, the defendant's testimony was "im-
peached" with evidence that he had merely omitted a fact from a previously
suppressed statement to police.268 On the other hand, James establishes that
if a defense witness testifies, the courts will not admit any unlawful proof in
response.
Meanwhile, the courts routinely dismiss cases that require illegal proof in
order to be legally sufficient, despite the fact that dismissal represents per-
haps the greatest affront to truth-seeking. They also virtually guarantee the
conviction of defendants whose cases contain enough lawful evidence to be
legally sufficient, but, considering both lawful and unlawful evidence, com-
prise proof beyond a reasonable doubt, unless those defendants are able to
mount a defense with the testimony of defense witnesses, rather than their
268. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 347 (1990). The impeachment use of the omission
presupposed that it was an admission by silence and, hence, powerful proof of guilt.
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269
The doctrine thus alternately favors truth-seeking or deterrence while
accomplishing neither, and celebrates the inconsistency as a form of balance,
rather than the political compromise it really is. The Court itself in Cruz v.
New York 270 provided the most devastating critique of such an approach,
noting that "[t]he law cannot command respect if... an inexplicable excep-
tion to a supposed constitutional imperative is adopted. '271
This conclusion does not assert that there is something in the nature or
logic of the exception that requires that its boundaries be incoherent or that
there is something inherently wrong with compromising the exclusionary
rules with evidentiary principles. Indeed, this article employs an internal
critique of the Court's efforts to develop boundary doctrines capable of ac-
complishing its asserted goals precisely to avoid any such prejudgment. It
may well be unfortunate that the exclusion of evidence from a criminal trial
carnot achieve adequate deterrence without sacrificing truth-seeking.
The reason underlying this failure is that the Court conceives of the
criminal process as bifurcated into investigative and trial components; these
components are characterized by differing norms, which can be weighed or
balanced against each other. This conception, however, ignores the overlap
between investigation and trial within the criminal process in both empirical
practice and normative theory.272
In the policy approach, the separation of investigative and trial norms
manifests itself in the inevitable trade-off between truth-seeking and deter-
rence. But in order to offer a rational method for resolving the trade-off in
favor of truth-seeking or deterrence, the Court has denied that the goals are
always contradictory in direct proportion to each other. It has thus claimed
that the boundary of the exception lies at the point at which its costs to
deterrence outweigh its benefits to truth-seeking.
The usual critique of this balance has focused on the inability to compare
these costs and benefits because they are "incommensurate. 2 73 The analysis
presented here yields the opposite conclusion. The Court's attempts to
achieve net gains to truth-seeking or deterrence have failed because the two
goals are, in fact, commensurate. The incentive to obtain proof illegally will
269. We might ask why the integrity of the criminal process requires application of the exclu-
sionary rules and the impeachment exception alternatively to remove a case from the factfinder
entirely (by dismissal, if lawful proof is insufficient) and to assure conviction of a defendant about
whom the prosecution has not only sufficient lawful evidence, but proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
considering the defenses foreclosed or contradicted by illegal proof.
270. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
271. Id. at 193 (rejecting an exception to Bruton's exclusionary rule for codefendants' "inter-
locking" confessions).
272. For an excellent description of how the principles of proof do (and should, where they do
not) structure the tasks of gathering evidence before trial and presenting the evidence at trial, see
TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE: How TO Do THINGS WrrH
FACTS BASED ON WIGMORE'S SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (1991); see also James L. Kainen, The
Rationalist Tradition at Trial, 60 FORD. L. REv. 1085, 1093-95 (1992) (book review) (extending
Anderson and Twining's approach to the rules of evidence as well as to the principles of proof).
273. See note 74 supra.
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be determined by the probative value of the proof, a measure that also will
determine the proof's contribution to truth-seeking. Thus, defining the
scope of the exception will always be undermined by the realization that
broadening (narrowing) the exception will enhance (detract from) truth-
seeking at the same rate at which it detracts from (enhances) deterrence.
The balancing analysis thus reproduces, rather than resolves, the contradic-
tion between the two goals.
In addition to analyzing the theoretical incentive to unlawful action cre-
ated by the exception, the Court has occasionally recognized that deterrence
ultimately depends upon the actual behavioral effects of the rules and not the
logic of incentives. Those occasional references to the rules' empirical bases
have spawned an immense literature about how, or whether, the exclusion-
ary rules actually "deter" illegal conduct.274
274. The Court, unlike various commentators, has studiously avoided entering into the debate
about the behavioral effect of the exclusionary rules in practice because of the difficulties of proof
and the ambiguity of the policy implications of that debate. Compare Richard A. Posner, Excessive
Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. Rnv. 635 (1982) (arguing
that empirical research can inform judgments about "efficient" level of constitutional violations) with
Arval A. Morris, The Exclusionary Rule, Deterrence and Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 57
WASH. L. Rnv. 647 (1982) (no research design suggested by Posner's analysis can answer question
of efficient level of violations); see also Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1, 36 n.151 (1987) (discussing "costs" of the
Fourth Amendment); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure 37 U.
CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970). Different conceptions of the empirical "deterrence" question proliferate at
a rate far exceeding our ability to generate empirical evidence, such that it is always possible to argue
persuasively that the available research answers the wrong question. Kamnisar, for example, argues
persuasively that the exclusionary rules have been in place for so long now that the relevant behav-
ioral question is the effect that reversal of the rules would have on a law enforcement community
whose attitudes are conditioned by those rules-a question that can only be answered by attitudinal
surveys eliciting hypothetical reactions. Kanisar, supra, at 21-23, 33-38. As might be expected,
such surveys show that reversal of the exclusionary rules would tend to cause police to take the
constitutional rights of defendants less seriously. Id. (discussing studies). Kamisar concedes that
the purportedly empirical deterrence debate rests upon which side is allocated the burden of persua-
sion. Kamisar, supra note 33, at 645. He is open to using these attitudinal surveys as a means of
allocating the burden of persuasion to the rules' opponents to show that eliminating the rules would
not increase the frequency of rule violations, even marginally. Id.
Implicit in his assignment of this burden is the notion that the rules can never impose "exces-
sive" costs because, ideally, the prosecution would obey the rules of constitutional criminal proce-
dure. Although evidence may be foregone as a result, that fact should be recognized to be an
unavoidable consequence of constitutional criminal procedure rather than an avoidable cost of the
exclusionary rules. See kL at 621. Although reached by different routes, my conclusion and
Kamisar's are similar in that we both conceive the choice between truth-seeking and deterrence as
the wrong way of thinking about the exclusionary rules. The difference is that I view the debate as
not scientific at all. In equating "deterrence" with eliminating incentives for noncompliance with the
rules, for example, I follow the Court's own analysis. Kamisar, on the other hand, argues that the
analyses of deterrence and incentives are not the same thing. See, eg., id. at 597 n.204, 636-38;
Kamisar, supra, at 47. He asserts that although the exclusionary rules may remove incentives to
gather evidence unlawfully, the rules do not really "deter" because they impose no penalty for non-
compliance. Id The distinction is insignificant, however, since the costs imposed by the rules in-
lude the opportunity costs associated with noncompliance. The rules may be seen as deterrents
because the imposition of such costs amounts to a penalty.
Although Kamisar would have the Court analyze deterrence as if the rules imposed no opportu-
nity costs at all, even steadfast opponents of the impeachment exception admit the existence of such
costs. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 724-25 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (implicitly
arguing that applying impeachment exception on the facts in Harris did not eliminate opportunity
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Nonetheless, even the best empirical research on the actual behavioral
effects of the exclusionary rules and the impeachment exception is unhelpful
in effectively defining the scope of either in terms of the truth-seeking/deter-
rence balance. Suppose, for example, that such research indicated that dif-
ferent institutional goals influence police and prosecutorial behavior, quite
apart from the incentives created by the exception, and that these goals ac-
count for the frequency of violations. The opinions in James briefly ven-
tured into this territory. Justice Kennedy suggested that the police generally
stop investigating after having obtained "sufficient evidence to present proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in the case in chief" and, therefore, have
few occasions to act on the incentive to obtain impeachment proof.275 Ac-
ceptance of this view would explain why, for example, the Court has argued
that the prosecution might not continue interrogation in circumstances in
which it has "little to lose and much to gain."' 276
Assuming that research verifies Justice Kennedy's perception of reality,
what normative goals would incorporate that fact into the truth-seeking/
deterrence balance? Implicitly, Justice Kennedy made an argument that
neither he, nor any other proponent of the impeachment exception, would
accept if its implications were made explicit. He implied that the prosecu-
tion routinely does less than an ideal investigation would require, and that
we should reward this behavior by admitting illegal proof. The proof may be
admitted without undue cost to deterrence because the police do not rou-
tinely obtain similar proof. Ironically, Justice Kennedy urged this result in
the interest of "truth-seeking," even though the costs to the truth-seeking
process of insufficient or inadequate prosecutorial investigations are likely
far to outweigh any costs incurred by not having an impeachment exception.
If the prosecution does not routinely anticipate all innocent explanations for
costs to police in failing to give Miranda warnings); Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v.
New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80
YALE L.J. 1198, 1218-21 (1971) (arguing that the need to eliminate "all significant incentives" to
gather evidence unlawfully applies to "deliberate" violations when the police subjectively perceive
they "could not secure the evidence by lawful means" and thus implicitly conceding that opportu-
nity costs in cases of violations committed under different conditions deter violations that would
otherwise occur). Thus, given that some deterrence is achieved, the question is the extent to which it
should weigh in the balance. This determination is incoherent for reasons far more fundamental
than the existence of limited knowledge about the effect of opportunity costs on official behavior.
The question in the debate is not simply how to allocate the burden of persuasion, but rather how to
decide what the participants should be attempting to prove.
It is, of course, plausible to assume that the behavioral effects of the exception are not accu-
rately predicted by the exception's boundaries. Indeed, the Court has made such an assumption in
applying the impeachment exception to circumstances, such as those in Hass and Harvey, in which
the prosecution would seem to have little to lose and everything to gain from engaging in the viola-
tion. Its approval of the application of the exception, irrespective of this fact, indicates that the
Court understands the actual behavioral effects of the rules to be far more complex than its analysis
of the incentives alone would indicate.
275. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 329 (1990) (Kennedy, J. dissenting). In contrast, Justice
Brennan suggested that the police would frequently continue to investigate after having established a
prima facie case and, thus, would often overstep constitutional bounds because of the impeachment
exception. See id at 318-19.
276. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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its proof, and does not obtain whatever proof it can to prove those possibili-
ties false, we should expect it to do so in the interest of truth-seeking and
adequate law-enforcement.
Even if Justice Kennedy's view incorporates empirical reality, we should
not seek an approach that merely reflects reality. Instead, we must choose
which aspects of that reality are to be changed and which are to be accepted
as consistent with our instrumental goals. Even supporters of the impeach-
ment exception are likely to see its truth-seeking benefits as few if it tolerates
inadequate investigations. Rather than assuming the existence of inadequate
investigations, the doctrine should assume the ideal-that proper investiga-
tions will routinely be made. The instrumental approach to the exclusionary
rules purports to be concerned with changing reality to comply with consti-
tutional rules of criminal procedure. If the ideal situation includes complete
investigations by the prosecution using lawful means, then there is no instru-
mental justification for the impeachment exception.
Moreover, accepting that the prosecution's behavior is not determined by
the anticipated use of evidence at trial is inconsistent with the deterrence
rationale of the exclusionary rules. That rationale is built on the premise
that the police will be sufficiently concerned with obtaining convictions to
incorporate trial norms into their routine practice. If this were not the case,
prohibiting the use of evidence at trial would be an illogical means of encour-
aging compliance with constitutional guarantees. Although the compliance
achieved may be less than ideal, proof of nondeterrence is as likely to reflect
the fact that trial norms are insufficiently incorporated into investigative de-
cisions, as it is to suggest that the exclusionary rules exact excessive costs. 277
Similarly, the distinction between trial and investigative norms under-
mines the incorporation of the anti-perjury principle into the judicial integ-
rity rationale for the exclusionary rules. An ex post review of illegally
obtained proof may expose defense "perjury" just as effectively as it exposes
erroneous factfinding. But as in the case of the truth-seeking/deterrence bal-
ance, weighing factfinding against fact-gathering norms is misguided. To
play a meaningful role in defining the integrity of the criminal process,
courts must realize that norms governing fact-gathering also define the integ-
rity of the factfinding process. The Court's analysis itself belies the distinc-
tion between admitting illegally obtained proof into evidence and using it for
impeachment purposes. The impeachment exception assures that illegally
277. This article thus denies the existence of any conceptual boundary between investigation
and trial preparation. Cf Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 365-67 & nn.9, 10, 12 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (making explicit the dependence of the deterrence analysis on the distinction between
investigation and trial preparation, and noting that it is supportable only if different substantive
standards govern prosecutorial behavior before and after criminal charges are filed). As a normative
matter, investigation and trial preparation are identical. In practice, the two may diverge because of
lack of training, poor supervision, and the existence of bureaucratic structures and incentives that
interfere with the normative ideal. But there is no reason to suppose that the practical distinction is
a given that varies independently of the exclusionary rules, one of whose primary goals is to educate
the law enforcement community to the point that the distinction no longer exists. In any event, it
makes no sense to premise the impeachment exception on an empirical reality that the exclusionary
rules are designed to eliminate.
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obtained evidence will be used, as surely as if it is admitted, in assisting the
prosecution to establish guilt. Thus, despite the Court's apparent view that
the impeachment exception is required to foster separate norms governing
investigation and trial, separating those norms subjects the prosecution to
contradictory standards. The judge who feels implicated in both unlawful
evidence-gathering and defense perjury may intervene to resolve that conflict
in a particular case, but that solution confuses the integrity of a criminal trial
with the personal integrity of the judge presiding over it. The integrity of the
criminal process is defined by the values, including those of constitutional
criminal procedure, that legitimize outcomes in light of the procedures used
to attain them.
Taken together, the critiques of the impeachment exception as a matter
of policy, or as a matter of principle, question whether the integrity of the
criminal process is served by the Court's distinction between evidence that is
unlawfully obtained and that which is unlawfully used. The Court uses this
distinction to justify applying the impeachment exception only to the for-
mer.278 It has not applied the impeachment exception to rules of criminal
procedure that prohibit the use of evidence itself.2 79 This distinction fails to
construct meaningful boundaries precisely because it is conceptually impos-
sible for evidence to be illegally obtained, but nonetheless lawfully used at
trial. The distinction perpetuates the illusion that it is possible to strike a
compromise between evidentiary values and values of constitutional criminal
procedure-and thus to have it both ways-while nonetheless denying that
the conflict between the two requires a compromise at all.
The impeachment exception is, therefore, inconsistent with instrumental
and noninstrumental rationales for the exclusionary rules insofar as they as-
sist in preserving the integrity of the criminal process. Its continued exist-
ence results from a political compromise within the Court that undermines
the accepted goals of the exclusionary rules. The Court's justification for the
exception-the limited need for deterrence and the possibility that defense
perjury may be prevented without convicting the defendant with illegally
obtained proof-conceals unavoidable judgments about the desirability of
constitutional criminal protections in the guise of evidence law.
The status quo, perhaps, furthers the strategic agendas of both the propo-
nents and opponents of the exclusionary rules by alternatively demonstrating
that the evidentiary costs of those rules are high or that their costs are much
278. See id. (impeachment exception applies to evidence obtained in violation of prophylactic
rule protecting Sixth Amendment rights announced in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986));
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (impeachment exception applies to evidence obtained in viola-
tion of prophylactic rules protecting Fifth Amendment rights announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1964)); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (same); cf Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298 (1985) (Miranda warnings and related protections not rights protected by the Constitution, but
rather measures to insure protection of right against compulsory self-incrimination).
279. The use of immunized or involuntary statements against the maker would amount to
compelled self-incrimination. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (prohibiting use of
statements obtained pursuant to grant of use immunity to impeach defendant); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385 (1978) (prohibiting use of involuntary statements to impeach defendant).
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overstated. Most importantly, however, determinations about the scope of
the exception-and the fact that there is an evidentiary-based exception at
all-highlight the Court's belief that even accepted constitutional rules of
criminal procedure are sometimes not worth their evidentiary costs. Despite
the Court's claim, the boundary doctrines intended to provide a coherent
way of identifying those occasions are far from neutral.
The most serious consequence of the impeachment exception is that it
allows opponents of the exclusionary rules to blame the courts for the occur-
rence of crime, even though our criminal justice system is the most efficient
in the world at putting people in prison.28 0 The exception legitimates com-
plaints about the evidentiary costs of the exclusionary rules and thus assists
the attempt to hold those rules responsible for failures in law enforcement.
These complaints deny the far more serious social problems that impede ef-
forts to prevent crime. These social problems affect the victims of crime to a
degree that renders the costs of the exclusionary rules trivial.28 1 The victims
of crime observe the capricious and perpetually unstable protection provided
by the exclusionary rules and misunderstand the courts to be the source of
the problem, rather than an institution whose constitutional mission is to
assure that the cure is not worse than the-disease. If the impeachment ex-
ception teaches us anything, it is that succumbing to the temptation to qual-
ify the exclusionary rules according to their evidentiary costs in particular
cases will routinely undermine the Court's authority to define the constitu-
tional integrity of the criminal process.
B. Eliminating the Impeachment Exception
Eliminating the impeachment exception and returning to Agnello would
acknowledge that the limits of the exclusionary rules are best analyzed in
terms of constitutional criminal procedure rather than the rules of evidence.
Although the Agnello Court implied that there were narrow circumstances
in which a defendant might waive his right to exclude illegally obtained evi-
dence, it recognized that appropriate limitations on exclusion do not depend
upon evidentiary considerations. It did not distinguish between exclusionary
280. See U.S. Has Highest Rate of Imprisonment in World, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1991, at A14.
In the United States, 426 of every 100,000 males are in prison; in South Africa, the country with the
second highest rate of imprisonment, 333 of every 100,000 males are incarcerated. Id Without
reliable evidence of comparative crime rates making it possible to hold this factor constant, it is
imprecise to equate the highest rate of imprisonment in the world with the most efficient system of
incarceration. Nonetheless, the rate of imprisonment in the United States is so much higher than
that of all other countries that it is difficult to imagine that the efficiency of the American criminal
justice system is not a primary factor contributing to the disparity. For an interesting account of the
persistent belief in the inefficiency of American criminal justice despite compelling empirical evi-
dence to the contrary, see John H. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science:
From the Yale Experience, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 459, 504 (1979).
281. Regardless of one's view of the immediate legal implications of evidence suggesting the
existence of biological and environmental determinants of crime, that evidence clearly suggests that
meaningful approaches to the problem of crime can hardly be limited to reforming aspects of the
criminal justice system. See Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free
Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 619-49 (1988) (reviewing research results on the impact
of environmental and biological factors on criminality).
1368 [Vol. 44:1301
THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
rules prohibiting illegally obtained evidence and those rules prohibiting evi-
dence from being illegally used. Instead, it viewed the exclusionary rules as
establishing an immunity against the use of illegally obtained evidence. This
immunity could be waived only when exclusion no longer served its substan-
tive purposes. 2 8 2
Specifically, the Agnello Court held that Agnello had done nothing to
justify the introduction of the suppressed can of cocaine because he had not
mentioned it.283 Agnello had only claimed lack of knowledge about the
packets of cocaine with which he was caught. From an evidentiary perspec-
tive, the Agnello holding makes no sense at all: One cannot imagine why
Agnello would mention the can of cocaine, while he hardly could have
raised a defense to which the can of cocaine would have been more appropri-
ate and probative rebuttal. From the perspective of criminal procedure,
however, the holding makes sense. It requires that the defendant surrender
the constitutional right which exclusion is designed to protect before the
proof can be admitted. In Agnello itself, for example, the Court required
that the defendant waive the privacy interest guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment's condemnation of the search of his home. Whether he
"opened the door" to the contents of his house depends upon whether he
waived his protected privacy interest and not upon whether he raised a de-
fense to which the evidence was probative rebuttal. 28 4
Returning to Agnello thus would hold the exclusionary rules inapplicable
only where they no longer served their underlying substantive purpose in a
particular case.285 Although this approach would reverse each of the
282. The term immunity is used here as the opposite of liability and the correlative of disabil-
ity. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). The Court's concept of the exclusionary rule as creating an
immunity against the use of evidence followed from its elision of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
rather than from the analysis of the trial process offered in this article. See Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925) (noting that "[i]t is well settled that, when properly invoked, the Fifth
Amendment protects every person from incrimination by the use of evidence obtained through
search or seizure made in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment"); see also Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 407-09 (1976), the Court appeared to overrule Boyd insofar as it confused
substantive rights protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Fisher Court, however, did
not distinguish between illegally used and illegally obtained evidence in the context of applying the
exclusionary rules. At most, therefore, Fisher established that the Agnello Court reached the right
result for the wrong reasons.
283. Agnello, 269 U.S. at 35.
284. That is not to say that a waiver doctrine would not have its own problems. In interpret-
ing the scope of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, the Court has frequently
discussed the scope of the appropriate waiver in light of its evidentiary consequences. See, eg.,
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943). Under
the approach suggested here, a finding of waiver would have to be justified by the values underlying
the substantive right protected by exclusion rather than its evidentiary consequences.
285. See Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 1000 & n.314 (distinguishing between exceptions to consti-
tutional norms that are "'internal' to the theory of the constitutional provision under review" and
those that arise from "'external' limits imposed on constitutional provisions"). Aleinikoff seems to
associate internal exceptions exclusively with the principle-based approach to constitutional adjudi-
cation. For example, he is able to support the result in Home Bldg & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding mortgage moratorium despite the contract clause), only because it prop-
erly identified a role for balancing in the "extreme and rare case" where instrumental needs can
July 1992] 1369
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
Court's cases applying the exception, it would be consistent with several
lower court decisions. For example, in those cases where the defendant has
deliberately introduced the fruits of an illegal search or of an unlawful police
interrogation, courts have held that the substantive values secured by the
rules prohibiting the interrogation or search were no longer served by exclu-
sion, because the defendant had waived his privilege against the use of the
evidence.2 6 This approach draws on existing notions that the defendant
should control the use of illegally obtained evidence, but removes the issue
from the context of evidentiary considerations. 2 87 That Havens, for exam-
ple, could employ all inferences stemming from the absence in evidence of
the contents of his suitcase does not necessarily mean that he should be per-
mitted to establish, by his own proof, cross-examination, or argument,288
that the suitcase did not contain the T-shirts without waiving his right to
properly override constitutional provisions. Id. at 1000. Chief Justice Hughes's central argument in
Blaisdell, however, aptly illustrates how internal exceptions can be fully consistent with instrumental
justifications for constitutional provisions. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 442-43 (arguing that the "state-
ment that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day... carries its own
refutation" and, thus, "the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which
the good of all depends" is consistent with the contract clause). The argument for internal limita-
tions in the text applies both to instrumental and noninstrumental approaches to the exclusionary
rules.
286. See, eg., Hunt v. Cox, 312 F. Supp. 637, 641-43 (E.D. Va. 1970) (holding defendant's
post-arrest silence admissible to rebut defendant's testimony that he had offered an alibi to police at
the time of his arrest); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 178 n.4 (9th Cir. 1968) (implying in
dicta that even the prohibition on impeachment use of illegal statements yields "where the defend-
ant's testimony puts in issue the very question of what he told the police") (quoting United States v.
Armetta, 378 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1967)). The Court unsuccessfully attempted an evidentiary
explanation of a similar result in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Despite disallowing the im-
peachment use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence, the Court claimed in dicta that such use would
be allowed if the defendant claimed "to have told the police the same version upon arrest [as that
offered at trial]" because "the fact of the earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpa-
tory story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his behavior following arrest." Id.
at 619 n.l1. This conception of limited use, however, is false because neither the defendant's claim
of offering his alibi to police nor the prosecution's challenge to that testimony is at all relevant unless
it yields inferences concerning the truth of the alibi offered at trial. If Doyle should yield in such a
circumstance, it should do so because its purpose is not served by exclusion in that instance, not
because of any limited evidentiary use of the defendant's silence.
287. The suggested tests for permitting rebuttal with illegal evidence all argue for regulating
the use of illegal evidence with a meaningful waiver requirement. Removed from the evidentiary
context, these tests can be used as a starting point for evaluating waiver as a constitutional, rather
than an evidentiary, matter.
288. Where the question of waiver is properly understood as a constitutional, rather than an
evidentiary matter, the means by which constitutional protections are waived is not dispositive. A
defendant might surrender his immunity from the use of illegal evidence by cross-examination or
argument, as well as by the introduction of his own proof. The dispositive question is whether a
finding that the immunity is waived is consistent with the purposes of the underlying substantive
constitutional protection. Thus, where the prosecution elicits that "something" was found during an
illegal search in order to establish that inculpatory evidence was found, cross-examination by defense
counsel rebutting that inference should not effect a waiver of a defendant's privacy interest. On the
other hand, where the defense elicits the existence of an illegal search, but not its fruits, in order to
establish that nothing inculpatory was found, the defendant's privacy interest may properly be
deemed waived. See People v. Payne, 98 Ill. 2d 45, 49-50, 456 N.E.2d 44,46 (1983), cert denied, 465
U.S. 1036 (1984). The question is not whether the defense misrepresents to the jury the "actual"
facts of the case, but rather whether continued exclusion serves the privacy interest that the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect.
1370 [Vol. 44:1301
THE IMPEACHMENT EXCEPTION
privacy in the contents. The defendant's privacy interest is no longer served
if he has deliberately chosen to focus public scrutiny on its contents.
This approach thus recasts the scope of exclusion at trial in light of its
consequences for the substantive values served by the exclusionary rules.
The Court understood the issue in these terms until its decision in Walder
confused the question of waiving an evidentiary privilege against admission
of character proof with the separate issue of waiving a constitutional privi-
lege against use of illegally obtained evidence at trial. The Court concluded
that because Walder had waived his evidentiary protection, he had waived
his constitutional protection as well. 289 This holding was erroneous, how-
ever, because the latter has nothing to do with the former. It was irrelevant
that Walder did not have to raise the issue of his character in mounting a
defense, or otherwise deny all the elements of the case against him.
Unfortunately, the error of Walder was perpetuated not only by the ex-
ception's proponents, but also by its opponents. They conceded that the ex-
ception could be reconciled with the exclusionary rules because, properly
limited, it would not undermine the necessary deterrence nor contribute to
conviction with illegal proof.29° Having failed to challenge Walder, those
opposing the growth of the exception were forced to draw the kinds of evi-
dentiary distinctions that strengthened it. They, too, suggested that these
distinctions can provide a neutral framework in which the Court can prop-
erly claim to have realized the benefits of the exclusionary rules without
their evidentiary costs. Reversing Walder would return the issue to its
proper context-one concerned with the integrity of the criminal process. A
vision of that integrity requires difficult choices about the goals of constitu-
tional criminal procedure. It is better to confront those issues, however,
than to adhere to an empty neutrality that begets an incoherent analysis
capable only of confusing wisdom with arbitrary compromise. By con-
fronting those issues, the Court would remind us that constitutional criminal
procedure necessarily embodies a normative conception of the integrity of
the criminal process whose worth belies the claim that it may be attained
without evidentiary cost.
CONCLUSION
The debate over the exclusionary rules has been dominated by the discus-
sion about whether those rules should reflect policies or principles.291 The
internal critique of the impeachment exception, however, shows that this
emphasis is misplaced. Whether the impeachment exception represents a
policy or principle to be balanced against constitutional criminal procedure
is less significant than the belief that the appropriate evidentiary boundary
289. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
290. See, eg., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that "collateral use" doctrine implied by Walder defines proper scope of the impeachment
exception).
291. See generally Kamisar, supra note 33; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929-44 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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doctrine can conform the exception to the purposes of the exclusionary
rules, however conceived. While the principle and policy approaches can
help conceptualize the problem, it is the boundary doctrine that ultimately
bears the burden of proving illusory the inevitable conflicts between values
within each approach and transforming competing principles or policies into
coherent limitations on the exception. Thus, the Court's failed attempts to
serve conflicting values in practice may teach us more than our efforts to
reason from prior adherence to an instrumentalist or noninstrumentalist
conception of constitutional rights.
The analysis of the impeachment exception provides a case in point. The
debate about instrumental and noninstrumental justifications for the exclu-
sionary rules has served to obscure, rather than to enlighten, the value judg-
ments embodied in the exception. Both the deterrence and judicial integrity
rationales have erroneously assumed that appropriate use of unlawful evi-
dence is consistent with constitutional norms that determine that such evi-
dence was illegally obtained. Justice Brennan, for example, while attacking
the Court's instrumental analysis as a methodological error certain to com-
promise constitutional rights, nonetheless failed to challenge the Walder
Court's admission of "collateral" evidence as inconsistent with his vision of
judicial integrity.292
Yet, the Court's perceptions of judicial integrity are undoubtedly as re-
sponsible for the development and continuation of the exception as any sin-
cere estimation of the "sufficiency" of deterrence. Ironically, Justice
Brennan wrote the James opinion, in which application of the instrumental
analysis halted nearly forty years of the exception's expansion, while simul-
taneously noting his previous support for the judicial integrity rationale for
evidentiary exclusion. 293 In the debate over principles and policies, how-
ever, the Court did not draw from the lower courts' experience and thus
wrongly conceived of the integrity of the investigative and trial components
of the criminal process as separate. That experience, however, provides the
most powerful argument for recognizing that the scope of the exclusionary
rules, whether perceived instrumentally or not, raises meaningful normative
questions about the constitutional integrity of the criminal process and not
the unavoidable evidentiary costs of that integrity. Our system of criminal
justice defines the integrity of factfinding at trial in light of constitutional
values, rather than predetermined outcomes. Our rules of criminal proce-
dure must reflect that integrity or they will surely undermine it.
292. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980) (Brennan, J. dissenting); see also
Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 274, at 1212 (arguing that Walder created a "limited exception re-
sponsive to the particular-and unfair-trial tactic of the defendant" with no attempt to explain why
the presentation of Walder's chosen defense was any more "unfair" than that at issue in Agnello).
293. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311, 312 n.1 (1990).
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